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A B S T R A C T
We develop a Clawback Strength Index and show that while some ﬁrms adopt unambiguous and
strong clawback provisions, others adopt weak ones. We ﬁnd that strong clawback adopters
experience improvements in ﬁnancial reporting quality, fewer CEO turnovers, and lower CEO
pay. We advance two possible explanations: First, clawback strength may be primarily re-
sponsible for the improvements in reporting quality. Second, strong clawbacks may yield beneﬁts
because they are part of a broader reform package. While our ﬁndings on reporting quality and
CEO turnover are consistent with both explanations, our results on CEO pay support only the
broader reform explanation.
1. Introduction
Clawback provisions (“clawbacks”) authorize ﬁrms to recoup compensation from executives upon the occurrence of ﬁnancial
restatements or executive misbehavior. Clawbacks were ﬁrst introduced by Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter,
SOX 304). SOX 304 requires CEOs and CFOs to return any earned incentive compensation following a ﬁnancial restatement due to
misconduct and puts the burden of enforcement on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Next to SOX 304, Section 954 of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter, DFA) introduced clawback rules in 2010 requiring ﬁrms
to adopt and enforce clawback provisions themselves. While Section 954 is not yet carved into law, many ﬁrms have voluntarily
started to adopt clawbacks. As of 2013, about 45% of Russell 3000 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms had such voluntary provisions in place.
Most studies report strong evidence that ﬁrm-initiated clawbacks are eﬀective in improving ﬁnancial reporting quality (Chan
et al., 2012; deHaan et al., 2013), and that investors respond positively to clawback adoption (e.g., Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2013).
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These studies treat clawbacks as a binary choice: A ﬁrm either does or does not have a clawback. The common interpretation of these
results is that the mere adoption of the clawback is the primary cause of the observed beneﬁts.
The strength and uniformity of the eﬀects attributed to clawback adoption is striking for two reasons: First, ﬁrms have con-
siderable freedom to design clawbacks. This freedom likely leads to a huge variation in clawback design across ﬁrms, which can
either draft weak provisions that indicate clawback adoption merely in name or draft strong provisions. Because executives are likely
to respond diﬀerently to these two types of clawbacks (Fried and Shilon, 2011), one can expect diﬀerential economic outcomes
conditional on clawback design, rather than a uniform eﬀect due to adoption. Thus, given that clawback design aﬀects executives’
behavior diﬀerently, the results found in prior studies should be interpreted with caution: The improvements in reporting quality may
not be the causal eﬀect of adopting a clawback per se but rather the eﬀect of adopting a clawback with a speciﬁc design.
Second, prior studies focus mainly on reporting risk driven by the CEO's reporting decision. They do not account for reporting risk
driven by factors beyond the CEO's immediate control. However, if ﬁrms truly care about their reporting quality, they are likely to
take measures to reduce overall reporting risk. Then again, the improvements in reporting quality may be interpreted not as the sole
eﬀect of adopting a clawback in isolation but as an outcome driven by the combined eﬀect of adopting a clawback with a speciﬁc
design and other simultaneous actions the ﬁrm takes to improve its reporting.
This study addresses these two concerns by both analyzing clawback design and distinguishing between two types of reporting
risk. As opposed to earlier studies on clawbacks, all of which focus on whether a ﬁrm adopts a clawback or not, we analyze the cross-
sectional variation in clawback design. We capture diﬀerences in clawback design by performing a comprehensive linguistic analysis
of 4,464 voluntarily adopted clawbacks between 2007 and 2013. Drawing on the linguistic analysis, we create an index for capturing
the strength of clawbacks (Clawback Strength Index). This index is based on ﬁve components that determine clawback strength: (1) the
compensation types that are subject to a potential recoupment, (2) the employee groups that are covered by the clawback, (3) the
extent to which the clawback mandates its enforcement, (4) the time period to which the clawback pertains, and (5) the various
events that trigger a potential compensation recoupment.
We ﬁnd a substantial variation in both the focus and scope of clawback design. We distinguish between two types of clawback
provisions: (a) provisions whose design suggests that clawback adoption is in name only and (b) provisions whose design indicates a
ﬁrm's intention to put real pressure on executives. We call type (a) “weak clawbacks” and type (b) “strong clawbacks.” Given that
ﬁrms understand the nature of clawbacks (Fried and Shilon, 2011), we can reasonably assume that they consciously choose a speciﬁc
design.
We argue that overall reporting risk consists of two components: controllable and non-controllable reporting risk. Controllable
reporting risk is the risk of a restatement caused by the CEO's decision to misreport. Non-controllable reporting risk is the risk of a
restatement caused by factors beyond the CEO's immediate control. This risk is aﬀected by properties of the contracting environment
of the ﬁrm that is shaped by other actors, such as the reporting decisions of lower level managers or monitoring intensity of external
auditors or boards. We assume that by initiating a clawback provision, the ﬁrm may change the CEO's reporting decision, thereby
reducing the controllable reporting risk but not the non-controllable reporting risk.1 Moreover, we assume that controllable reporting
risk decreases when clawbacks are strong. Yet ﬁrms that seriously care about their reporting may not solely rely on the strong
clawback. They are also likely to take other simultaneous actions to reduce non-controllable reporting risk.
We therefore advance two explanations for both our ﬁndings and those of earlier studies: one that draws causal eﬀects based on
clawback design (the isolated clawback explanation), not clawback adoption per se, and another one that also encompasses clawback
adoption as part of a ﬁrm's broader reform to reduce reporting risk overall (the broader reform explanation).
Because the CEO's expected costs from misreporting increase in clawback strength, we predict improvements in reporting quality
for strong clawback adopters. Furthermore, we also expect to observe improvements in reporting quality if the ﬁrm simultaneously
decreases non-controllable reporting risk as well.
Given that restating ﬁrms more often experience executive turnovers following a restatement (Desai et al., 2006), we expect to
observe fewer CEO turnovers if there are fewer incidences of ﬁnancial restatements due to the reduction of controllable or non-
controllable reporting risk or both. Thus we predict a decrease in the likelihood of a CEO turnover for strong adopters.
The distinction between controllable and non-controllable risk also has implications for CEO pay. If ﬁrms adopt a clawback solely
in isolation but do not simultaneously reduce non-controllable reporting risk, we predict an increase in CEO incentive pay: Strong
clawbacks penalize the CEO for both controllable and non-controllable reporting risk. Because the CEO's expected costs stemming
from the exposure to non-controllable reporting risk increase after the adoption of a strong clawback, the board needs to increase
CEO incentive pay to induce him or her to exert eﬀort. Thus observing an increase in pay is consistent with the isolated clawback
explanation. However, if ﬁrms adopt the strong clawback as part of a broader reform, together with other simultaneous actions to
reduce reporting risk, the overall package likely also reduces the CEO's expected costs associated with non-controllable reporting risk.
As non-controllable risk decreases, the need for increasing incentive pay also decreases. Indeed, when non-controllable reporting risk
is reduced to suﬃciently low levels, even a decrease in incentive pay may be feasible. Therefore, observing a decrease in pay would
refute the isolated clawback explanation while remaining consistent with the broader reform explanation.
Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) design combined with a propensity-score method that matches strong adopters to weak
adopters, we test our predictions by analyzing the consequences following the adoption of strong or weak clawbacks. Our ﬁndings are
1 Our distinction between controllable and non-controllable risk resembles the notion of “discretionary” vs. “innate” determinants of accruals quality in
Francis et al. (2005): Discretionary factors represent managerial choices and are similar to controllable risk, whereas innate ones resemble our notion of non-
controllable risk.
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consistent with our predictions that adopters of strong provisions experience (1) improvements in reporting quality, as evidenced by a
lower incidence of ﬁnancial restatements and other measures of reporting quality, (2) decreases in the likelihood of a CEO turnover,
and (3) a decrease in total and incentive-based CEO pay.
In subsequent analyses, we also separately compare matched pairs of strong (weak) clawback adopters and non-clawback
adopters. We ﬁnd that while strong clawback adopters experience signiﬁcant beneﬁcial changes in ﬁrm-level outcomes, weak
clawback adopters do not. Therefore, weak clawbacks appear ineﬀective.
Taken together, the changes in reporting quality and CEO turnover can be reconciled with both the isolated clawback and the
broader reform explanations. Strong clawbacks, either as a stand-alone mechanism or as part of a broader reform, are responsible for
the documented beneﬁts. However, the decrease in CEO pay supports only the broader reform explanation. This explanation implies
that our ﬁndings reﬂect the overall causal eﬀect of a broader reform, not the purely causal eﬀect of clawback strength.
Our study contributes to the literature on clawbacks in several ways. First, we provide novel evidence on clawback design. We
quantify the strength of clawbacks and show that ﬁrms with strong clawbacks experience beneﬁcial ﬁrm-level outcomes, while ﬁrms
with weak clawbacks do not. In contrast to earlier clawback studies, we emphasize the importance of speciﬁc clawback design
choices. Second, studying the design of corporate governance mechanisms is useful for making inferences about ﬁrms’ motives for
adopting such mechanisms. We therefore suggest that future research pay more attention to the design of governance tools. Third, our
study oﬀers and discusses two non-mutually exclusive explanations for our ﬁndings: The isolated clawback and the broader reform
explanations. The broader reform explanation provides a more comprehensive interpretation of our full set of results, without re-
jecting the possibility that strong clawbacks may act as a powerful tool as part of the broader reform package. From this perspective,
one can view the isolated clawback explanation as being embedded within the broader reform explanation. Fourth, clawback strength
can be interpreted as a proxy for the elements of a broader reform, elements that are implemented simultaneously with the clawback.
Because these elements likely vary across time and ﬁrms, capturing them in the cross-section is diﬃcult. In contrast, clawback
strength is observable. The documented decrease in CEO pay and our ﬁndings that the economic beneﬁts of clawbacks are con-
centrated only among strong adopters suggest that clawback strength can proxy for the unobservable elements of a broader reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background on clawbacks, and develops our hypotheses.
Section 3 discusses the index construction, our sample, and the research design. Section 4 presents and discusses our ﬁndings.
Section 5 explores the robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background and hypotheses
2.1. Background
The core objectives of clawback provisions are to prevent accounting misconduct and reduce reporting risk. Whether a voluntary
clawback is an eﬀective tool for inﬂuencing managerial behavior depends on two factors. The ﬁrst factor—given that clawback
provisions are usually triggered by earnings restatements—is the importance of earnings for executive compensation contracts.
Studies report that most ﬁrm-related variation in executives’ incentives stems from CEOs’ stock and option holdings (Hall and
Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 2003), thereby raising the question of whether earnings are a relevant contracting
variable.
Studies that use recent data report that ﬁrms increasingly tie CEO compensation to long-term accounting performance and that
earnings can be an important determinant of both cash and stock-based incentive compensation. For example, Li and Wang (2016)
study the multiyear accounting-based performance (MAP) contracts of S&P 500 ﬁrms and ﬁnd that the percentage of ﬁrms using them
more than doubled between 1997 and 2008. MAP contracts provide economically meaningful incentives: The mean annualized target
payout from MAP contracts is two times a CEO's base salary. Li and Wang (2016) show that over 80% of MAP contracts include at
least one earnings-based performance target and that over 50% rely solely on earnings-based targets. Bennett et al. (2017), using a
larger sample from 1998–2012, present similar percentages. Both of these studies suggest that earnings are becoming increasingly
important for executive compensation contracts.
The second factor explaining why a voluntary clawback is an eﬀective tool for inﬂuencing managerial behavior is the actual threat
of recouping incentive pay. As ﬁrms voluntarily adopt clawbacks and choose how to design them, this second factor is tightly linked
to the speciﬁc characteristics of the clawback provisions.
We capture these characteristics by creating a Clawback Strength Index from a linguistic analysis of nearly 4,500 voluntarily
adopted clawback provisions (see Section 3.1). The index reveals that clawbacks have diﬀerent strength levels, indicating that ﬁrms
use their ﬂexibility in formulating either strong or weak clawbacks. Strong clawbacks have a more comprehensive coverage of
clawback features, such as compensation coverage and clawback time period, suggesting higher out-of-pocket costs for executives
and, therefore, larger incentivizing eﬀects.
That clawback characteristics correlate with ﬁrms’motives to adopt clawback provisions is plausible. If the motive for adoption is
window-dressing, we will likely observe the adoption of weak clawbacks.2 Another motive for adoption can be the boards’ greater
commitment to reducing reporting risk (Denis, 2012). In that case, we will likely observe the adoption of strong clawbacks. While
2 The presence of symbolic rather than substantive provisions is consistent with the literature studying the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms.
Westphal and Graebner (2010), for example, argue that the adoption of visible governance structures, policies, and procedures can be more symbolic than substantive
when they are used primarily for managing the impression of outside observers.
M.H.R. Erkens et al. Journal of Accounting and Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
3
strong clawbacks can incentivize managers to report accurately and monitor ﬁnancial reporting with due diligence, weak clawbacks
are unlikely to provide managers with suﬃcient incentives.
In sum, ﬁnancial losses contribute to the costs that executives must face in case of restatements. Such losses may deter executives
from engaging in reporting irregularities. However, this potential eﬀect is subject to caveats. First, the link between earnings and
managerial incentives may be weaker than earlier clawback studies have assumed. Second, ﬁrms can attain even higher deterrence
eﬀects with tools such as the renegotiation of compensation contracts and dismissals—tools that were available to them before
clawback adoption (Denis, 2012). Supporting this view, various studies document a higher incidence of CEO turnover following
accounting irregularities (e.g., Desai et al., 2006; Hennes et al., 2008).
We next develop testable hypotheses. In so doing, we focus on the diﬀerences in the strength of clawback provisions and explain
the economic mechanisms through which these diﬀerences predict diﬀerential ﬁrm-level consequences.
2.2. Clawback strength and ﬁnancial reporting quality
Our ﬁrst hypothesis relates to clawback strength and reporting quality. We distinguish between two types of reporting risk that
can lead to low reporting quality and a subsequent restatement. The ﬁrst type of risk is driven by the CEO's reporting decision. We
name this type of reporting risk “controllable risk”. The second type of risk is beyond the CEO's immediate control. This risk is
aﬀected by properties of the contracting environment of the ﬁrm and is shaped by other actors, such as the reporting decisions of
lower level managers or monitoring intensity of external auditors or boards. We name this type of reporting risk “non-controllable
risk.”3 Non-controllable risk can lead to low reporting quality and a subsequent restatement, even if the CEO reports truthfully.
To ﬁx ideas, we rely on a principal-agent framework with moral hazard (Holmstrom, 1979), in which earnings are an important
determinant of CEO incentive pay. In an agency setting, expected compensation is the primary driver of incentives while the com-
pensation risk is the primary driver of the ﬁrm's agency cost. To keep our analysis simple, we focus on expected compensation as the
determinant of the CEO's decision.4 To obtain incentive pay, the CEO can decide to exert costly eﬀort to generate high earnings.
Alternatively, the CEO can save costly eﬀort by overstating earnings and untruthfully reporting high earnings. However, misreporting
can trigger a restatement and a CEO dismissal, leading to the loss of his or her expected future compensation.
Without a clawback, the CEO will choose to misreport when the beneﬁts of misreporting (not exerting eﬀort and pocketing
incentive pay) exceed the expected costs of misreporting (being dismissed and losing expected future compensation). Thus, even
when incentive pay is low, the CEO can still choose to misreport when he or she believes that the expected costs of misreporting are
relatively low. The introduction of a clawback provision increases the CEO's expected costs of misreporting. In addition to being
dismissed and the corresponding loss of future expected compensation with the ﬁrm, the CEO now also bears the expected costs of a
compensation forfeiture. These costs increase with clawback strength. Consequently, a strong clawback is more likely to incentivize
the CEO to not misreport than a weak clawback.
The CEO's decision to report truthfully under a strong clawback is associated with a reduction in expected costs stemming from
controllable reporting risk. However, a strong clawback also increases the expected costs stemming from the CEO's exposure to non-
controllable reporting risk: The ﬁrm may also recoup CEO incentive pay if non-controllable risk leads to a restatement.
If ﬁrms care a great deal about their reporting quality, they are likely to adopt a strong clawback while simultaneously in-
troducing other corporate governance actions for reducing the non-controllable risk. The ﬁrm can achieve such reductions in non-
controllable risk, for example, by (a) improving the board's level of oversight, allocating more time and attention to prepare for
meetings with executives, engaging in vigorous discussions, and asking probing questions (Laux and Laux, 2009); (b) improving the
ﬁrm's internal control process (Hermanson et al., 2012); or (c) improving the risk assessment process (Wagner and Dittmar, 2006).
Together, these actions constitute a reform package that is broader than merely adopting a clawback. The reform package can lower
the CEO's exposure to non-controllable reporting risk and thus allows for a more eﬀective use of a clawback clause.
Thus strong clawbacks—either in isolation as a stand-alone mechanism (the isolated clawback explanation) or in interaction with
the other corporate governance actions (the broader reform explanation)5—are likely to improve reporting quality, while weak
clawbacks are unlikely to do so.
Given these explanations, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1. Financial reporting quality increases after the adoption of a strong clawback.
2.3. Clawback strength and CEO turnover
Our second hypothesis relates to clawback strength and the eﬀect on CEO turnover. Previous studies ﬁnd a higher incidence of
CEO turnover following accounting irregularities (e.g., Desai et al., 2006; Hennes et al., 2008). For example, Desai et al. (2006) report
that about 60% of restating ﬁrms experience an executive turnover following a restatement. They argue that the dismissal of the CEO
3We recognize that the term “non-controllable risk” is imprecise because it may incorporate actions that the CEO can inﬂuence—but not as easily or eﬀectively as
the controllable risk.
4 Haubrich (1994), Lien (2002), and Bliss and Penigitzoglou (2004) provide evidence that risk-aversion parameters are generally very low. Thus, as risk aversion
appears to have a second-order eﬀect, it will unlikely change either the CEO's reporting decision or our predictions.
5 The broader reform explanation is also in line with previous corporate governance research, which argues that various governance mechanisms interact in
potentially important ways (Denis, 2001, 2012).
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may act as a partial substitute for public enforcement of accounting violations and may therefore decrease the costs of public
enforcement to the ﬁrm.
A strong clawback imposes additional costs on CEOs if they misreport. In addition to the costs of a potential turnover, CEOs also
face costs related to the clawback. As hypothesized in H1, these additional costs can lead to fewer restatements. We therefore also
hypothesize fewer CEO turnovers as a consequence of strong clawbacks. This line of reasoning is consistent with both the isolated
clawback and the broader reform explanations. We emphasize that the clawback provision itself does not substitute for a CEO
turnover. However, we expect to observe fewer CEO turnovers following the adoption of strong clawbacks, because reporting quality
improves.
As with our ﬁrst hypothesis, we expect changes in the likelihood of a CEO turnover for strong clawback adopters but not for weak
ones.
H2. The likelihood of a CEO turnover decreases after the adoption of a strong clawback.
2.4. Clawback strength and CEO compensation
Our third hypothesis relates to clawback strength and its eﬀect on CEO compensation. A clawback imposes costs on the CEO
stemming from both controllable and non-controllable reporting risks. The ﬁrm does not need to compensate the CEO for an increase
in expected costs associated with controllable risk as determined by his or her reporting decision. Instead, these costs incentivize the
CEO to not misreport (Hypothesis 1). However, if the clawback is adopted in isolation, the increase in expected costs associated with
non-controllable reporting risk reduces the CEO's expected pay: He or she may decide not to exert eﬀort because the received
incentive pay may be recouped. Therefore, to incentivize the CEO to exert eﬀort under a strong clawback, ceteris paribus, the ﬁrm
needs to increase CEO incentive pay.6
However, the need to increase CEO incentive pay under a strong clawback can be mitigated by a broader reform package that
reduces the expected costs associated with non-controllable reporting risk. As non-controllable risk decreases, the need for increasing
incentive pay also decreases. Indeed, when non-controllable reporting risk is reduced to suﬃciently low levels, even a decrease in
incentive pay may be feasible. Therefore, if the ﬁrm adopts a strong clawback while simultaneously reducing the expected costs
associated with non-controllable reporting risk, we expect either no change or a decrease in incentive pay. A decrease is also con-
sistent with the literature on the relationship between governance and compensation. For example, Dicks (2012) shows that gov-
ernance and incentive compensation act as substitutes, and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) report a decrease in CEO pay for ﬁrms
that enhanced their board oversight following the new 2003 governance rules issued by major U.S. stock exchanges.
In sum, the isolated clawback and the broader reform explanations provide opposite predictions for the expected change in CEO
pay following the adoption of a strong clawback. Our third hypothesis is therefore stated as competing hypotheses:
H3a. (the isolated clawback explanation). CEO incentive pay increases after the adoption of a strong clawback.
H3b. (the broader reform explanation). CEO Incentive pay either remains unchanged or decreases after the adoption of a strong
clawback.
3. Index construction, sample, and methodology
3.1. Index construction and sample
We obtain data on voluntary clawback adoptions from the Corporate Library, which covers all clawbacks of Russell 3000 ﬁrms
from 2007. We focus on nonﬁnancial ﬁrms that adopt a clawback provision between 2007 and 2013. Panel A of Table 1 shows 4,464
clawback provisions representing a clawback adoption rate of 26.78% for the entire sample period. Clawbacks became increasingly
popular over the years: the adoption rate was 11.63% in 2007, increased to 21.42% in 2009, and jumped to 45.20% in 2013.
To conduct our analyses, we construct a Clawback Strength Index that uses detailed information contained in all provisions to
proxy for the strength of a clawback policy. We build the index using a linguistic analysis that relies on the literature on clawback
provisions (e.g., Fried and Shilon, 2011; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2013) and SEC clawback regulation. Our index is the sum of ﬁve sub-
indices, reﬂecting the core elements of a clawback policy. We check the compensation types covered (Compensation Coverage), the
employees subject to potential recoupment (Employee Coverage), the extent to which the clawback mandates enforcement (En-
forcement), the time period to which the clawback pertains (Time Period), and the triggering events for a potential recoupment
(Trigger).
A clawback is more likely to be classiﬁed as strong if it covers a more comprehensive group of employees, if it comprises many
components of compensation over a long look-back period, if it obligates the ﬁrm to recoup compensation, and if it does not require
proof of executive misconduct as a precondition for activating a clawback policy. To ease comparability and interpretation, we ﬁrst
standardize each sub-index so that they all contribute equally to the overall index and then transform each standardized sub-index so
that they range within a [0–1] interval. The Clawback Strength Index is then:
6 Adopting a strong clawback can also serve as a costly signal, with the cost being the reduction of CEO incentives, the increase in CEO pay related to non-
controllable reporting risk, or both. Thus mimicking a strong clawback adopter is costly for a ﬁrm.
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= + + + +Clawback Strength Index Compensation Coverage Employee Coverage Enforcement Time Period Trigger
The index can take a maximum value of 5 and a minimum value of 0. Higher values indicate stronger provisions. Table 1, Panel B,
shows that the index ranges from 0.56 through 3.37 with a mean (median) of 1.85 (1.79), and a standard deviation of 0.42. The
statistics reveal that the strength of clawbacks diﬀers across ﬁrms, indicating that ﬁrms value the discretion to design their own
provisions. Appendix B provides detailed information on the elements of the index and its construction. We provide additional detail
and examples from clawback provisions in Internet Appendix B. We classify a ﬁrm as a strong or a weak adopter according to whether
its Clawback Strength Index lies above or below the yearly sample median of the index. Panel C of Table 1 shows that the Clawback
Strength Index increases slightly over time for both strong and weak adopters.
We model the decision to adopt a strong clawback, a weak clawback, or no clawback through an ordered-logit model in the pre-adoption
year. We then propensity-match strong adopters with weak adopters based on ﬁrm and governance characteristics. After excluding clawback
ﬁrms with inconsistent clawback strength levels and missing ﬁrm and governance data, our sample for the propensity-score matching (PSM)
consists of 743 unique clawback adopters (386 strong and 357 weak adopters), and 1,278 non-clawback adopters, representing a total of
5,328 ﬁrm-years in the matching equation. Panel D of Table 1 outlines the sample selection for the propensity-score matching in detail.
We obtain data on ﬁrms’ governance and ownership structure from the Corporate Library and Thomson Reuters, data on executive
compensation and CEO characteristics from ExecuComp, ﬁnancial data from Compustat, and audit, ﬁnancial restatement, and in-
ternal control weaknesses data from Audit Analytics.
Table 1
Clawback adopters.
Panel A: Number of clawback adopters by year (non-ﬁnancial Russell 3000 ﬁrms)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 - 2013
Number of ﬁrms with clawbacks 260 397 561 713 784 850 899 4,464
Total number of ﬁrms 2,235 2,754 2,619 2,473 2,385 2,217 1,989 16,672
Adoption rate (in %) 11.63 14.42 21.42 28.83 32.87 38.34 45.20 26.78
Panel B: Clawback Strength Index
Obs. Mean SD Min Median Max
Compensation coverage 4,464 0.29 0.12 0.00 0.25 1.00
Employee coverage 4,464 0.32 0.17 0.00 0.37 1.00
Enforcement 4,464 0.75 0.17 0.00 0.82 1.00
Time period 4,464 0.15 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00
Trigger 4,464 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.33 1.00
Clawback Strength Index 4,464 1.85 0.42 0.56 1.79 3.37
Panel C: Clawback Strength Index (median values) for strong and weak clawback adopters by year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 - 2013
Strong and weak adopters 1.76 1.78 1.78 1.82 1.84 1.82 1.76 1.79
Strong adopters 2.07 2.07 2.11 2.19 2.16 2.22 2.07 2.12
Weak adopters 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.57 1.55 1.58 1.48 1.51
Panel D: Sample selection for propensity-score matching
# Clawback provisions Unique ﬁrms
Full sample of clawback adopters 4,464 1,534
Less: Observations with missing link to Compustat −440 −236
Less: Observations with inconsistent clawback strength levels −1,002 −223
Subsample of clawback adopters 3,022 1,075
Thereof: Strong clawback adopters 1,520 541
Thereof: Weak clawback adopters 1,502 534
Less: Observations with missing data for propensity-score matching in pre-adoption year −831 −332
Less: Non-pre-adoption year observations of clawback adopters −1,448 —
Clawback adopters with available data for propensity-score matching in pre-adoption year 743 743
Thereof: Strong clawback adopters 386 386
Thereof: Weak clawback adopters 357 357
Non-clawback adopters with available data for propensity-score matching 4,585 1,278
Firms with available data for propensity-score matching 5,328 2,021
This table Panel A presents the number of ﬁrms that voluntarily adopted a clawback provision between 2007 and 2013. Panel B presents summary
statistics of the Clawback Strength Index and each of its subindices. Panel C presents the median values of the Clawback Strength Index for strong and
weak adopters (n=4,464), strong adopters (n=2,234), and weak adopters (n=2,230) by year. Panel D outlines the sample selection procedure
for the propensity-score matching in which we model the decision to adopt a strong clawback, a weak clawback, or no clawback via an ordered-logit
model.
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3.2. Research design
Our analysis compares changes in a sample of ﬁrms that have adopted strong clawbacks with a sample of control ﬁrms that have
adopted a weak clawback. As in other studies that analyze voluntary adoptions of governance mechanisms, our ﬁndings may be
inﬂuenced by omitted variables that are correlated with clawback strength and the outcome variables of interest (Armstrong et al.,
2010; Roberts and Whited, 2013). We use several empirical techniques to deal with this concern.
First, we employ a DiD design between the pre- and post-adoption periods to explore changes in ﬁnancial reporting quality, CEO
turnover, and CEO pay for strong clawback adopters compared to weak clawback adopters. This approach mitigates concerns that
unobserved time-invariant variables or market-wide factors drive the changes in our outcome variables.
Second, using a PSM method, we select strong and weak adopters for the DiD analysis. We estimate an ordered logistic propensity-
score model to assess the probability that a ﬁrm will choose among the following three alternatives: (1) not adopting a clawback, (2)
adopting a weak clawback, or (3) adopting a strong clawback. By doing so, we follow the assumption that ﬁrms understand the nature
of clawbacks and therefore choose a speciﬁc clawback design. Drawing on the estimated probabilities, we obtain pairs of ﬁrms that
have similar ﬁrm and governance characteristics prior to clawback adoption but that decide to adopt clawbacks with diﬀerent
strength levels.
To estimate the propensity-score model, we use several ﬁrm and governance characteristics that predict clawback adoption.
deHaan et al. (2013) ﬁnd, for example, that larger ﬁrms are more likely to adopt a clawback provision. Chan et al. (2012, 2015), and
Chan et al. (2013) suggest that ﬁrm complexity, monitoring diﬃculties, and a ﬁrm's past restatement history are associated with
clawback adoption. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ growth options are correlated with clawback adoption. These
studies also suggest that governance characteristics may partly determine clawback adoption. Drawing on this literature, our pro-
pensity-score model includes proxies for size (total assets), complexity (R&D, soft assets), monitoring (leverage, institutional own-
ership), current and past reporting quality (discretionary accruals, past restatement), growth opportunities (Tobin's Q), and corporate
governance characteristics (audit committee size, board meetings, CEO chair, independent directors, insider ownership). We also
include the following variables used in prior studies: cash return, change in receivables, loss, return on assets, return volatility, sales
growth, and industry-ﬁxed eﬀects.








+ ′ + +
Pr Clawbackstrength α β Audit committee size β Board meetings
β Cash return β CEO chair β Chg receivables
β Discretionary accruals β Independent directors
β Insider ownership β Institutional ownership
β Leverage β Loss β Past restatement
β R D β Return on assets β Return volatility
β Sales growth β Size β Softassets





















Clawback strength is an indicator variable equal to zero if the ﬁrm is a non-clawback adopter, one if the ﬁrm has adopted a weak
clawback, and two if the ﬁrm has adopted a strong clawback. Appendix A provides variable deﬁnitions, and Panel A of Table 2 reports
descriptive statistics of all variables employed in the matching equation.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the aggregated estimates of the ordered logistic regression. Column (2) reports the average coeﬃcient
estimate across year-speciﬁc estimations from 2007 through 2013. Column (3) reports an aggregated z-statistic, which is the sum of
the individual annual z-statistic divided by the square root of the number of years for which we estimate the propensity-score model
assuming independence over time. In column (4) we report the average marginal probability across all year-speciﬁc estimations. The
last two columns report the number of years for which the year-speciﬁc coeﬃcient is positive and negative, respectively.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrm size, the percentage of independent directors, the number of audit committee members, and the percentage of
institutional ownership are positively associated with clawback adoption and clawback strength. Furthermore, insider ownership and
sales growth are negatively associated with clawback adoption and strength. The model has reasonable explanatory power, with an
adjusted pseudo-R2 of 25.59%.
Next, we form matched pairs by selecting a ﬁrm that has adopted a strong clawback and another ﬁrm that has adopted a weak
clawback. We use a matching procedure without replacement and require a maximum propensity-score diﬀerence (caliper) of 0.03 to
decrease the likelihood of poor matches and to improve covariate balance (Shipman et al. 2017). The matching procedure results in
249 matched pairs of strong (treatment group) and weak adopters (control group). Panel C of Table 2 shows that the mean (median)
diﬀerence in propensity-scores is 0.013 (0.011).
We assess the covariate balance between the treatment and control groups and present the means (columns 1–2) and medians
(columns 3–4) of our matching covariates in Panel D of Table 2. We conduct both a parametric t-test of the diﬀerence in means
(column 5) and a non-parametric bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of the diﬀerences between two distributions (column
6). The two-tailed p-values show that we achieve covariate balance for all 19 covariates (p-values> 0.10). Following Jayaraman and
Milbourn (2015), we also present the normalized diﬀerences in matching covariates (column 7). We calculate the normalized dif-
ferences as the diﬀerence in means for the strong and weak adopter groups divided by the square root of the average of the group
variances. Because all normalized diﬀerences are below the cutoﬀ of 0.25 (as suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), the




Panel A. Firm characteristics
Full sample No clawback Strong clawback Weak clawback
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Audit committee size 4.334 1.681 4.186 1.543 5.391 2.178 5.087 2.102
Board meetings 7.737 3.532 7.660 3.550 8.220 3.434 8.207 3.325
Cash return 0.102 0.201 0.096 0.209 0.133 0.131 0.145 0.131
CEO chair 0.479 0.500 0.470 0.499 0.521 0.500 0.549 0.498
Chg. in acc. receivables 0.009 0.042 0.010 0.042 0.004 0.037 0.011 0.039
Discretionary accruals 0.083 0.119 0.085 0.120 0.071 0.117 0.069 0.103
Independent directors 0.708 0.100 0.701 0.099 0.753 0.084 0.748 0.095
Insider ownership 0.207 0.226 0.224 0.231 0.092 0.151 0.106 0.155
Institutional ownership 0.703 0.258 0.687 0.262 0.808 0.193 0.804 0.202
Leverage 0.186 0.222 0.180 0.227 0.234 0.186 0.216 0.189
Loss 0.298 0.457 0.318 0.466 0.153 0.360 0.202 0.402
Past restatement 0.066 0.248 0.065 0.247 0.060 0.237 0.076 0.265
R&D 0.292 1.370 0.317 1.422 0.178 1.164 0.099 0.711
Return on assets −0.007 0.198 −0.013 0.206 0.029 0.140 0.032 0.139
Return volatility 0.033 0.015 0.034 0.015 0.028 0.014 0.028 0.012
Sales growth 0.144 0.449 0.152 0.468 0.071 0.293 0.121 0.308
Size 6.278 1.385 6.054 1.214 7.703 1.504 7.612 1.629
Soft assets 0.513 0.241 0.506 0.242 0.571 0.235 0.549 0.231
Tobin's Q 1.994 1.496 2.032 1.526 1.730 1.228 1.791 1.308
Number of observations 5,328 4,585 386 357













Audit committee size + 0.759⁎⁎⁎ 4.04 0.049 6 1
Board meetings + 0.380⁎⁎⁎ 2.85 0.020 7 0
Cash return – −0.406 −0.97 −0.034 2 5
CEO chair – 0.135 1.32 0.008 6 1
Chg. in acc. receivables – −0.739 −0.65 0.022 3 4
Discretionary accruals + 0.326 1.10 0.040 4 3
Independent directors + 2.323*** 4.14 0.131 7 0
Insider ownership – −2.556*** −7.91 −0.155 0 7
Institutional ownership + 0.560** 2.32 0.036 7 0
Leverage – −0.767*** −3.07 −0.039 1 6
Loss – −0.381** −2.25 −0.020 0 7
Past restatement + 0.025 0.50 0.007 4 3
R&D – −0.320 −1.29 −0.015 2 5
Return on assets + −0.043 −1.31 0.003 2 5
Return volatility + 7.083 0.72 0.404 4 3
Sales growth – −0.734*** −2.84 −0.037 1 6
Size + 0.807*** 19.88 0.045 7 0
Soft assets + 0.904*** 3.86 0.051 7 0
Tobin's Q + 0.023 0.49 0.001 4 3
Intercept No clawback→Weak
clawback
+ 11.735*** 15.93 7 0
Intercept Weak clawback→
Strong clawback
+ 12.748*** 17.19 7 0
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes
Observations (over all years) 5,328
Adjusted Pseudo-R2 25.59%
Panel C: Diﬀerences in propensity scores for matched pairs
Matched pairs Mean Std. dev. Min. Median Max
Strong vs. Weak 249 0.013 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.029















Audit committee size 5.265 5.201 5.000 5.000 0.738 1.000 0.030
(continued on next page)
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economic diﬀerences in covariates between the two groups are negligible. Overall, both tests suggest that our estimates of the average
treatment eﬀect are unlikely to be confounded by diﬀerences in covariates across the two groups.
We next use our matched ﬁrm pairs of strong and weak clawback adopters in a DiD design to study changes in ﬁnancial reporting




Outcome variable α β Strong clawback β After
β Strong clawback After β Control variables
β Industry Year
Σ
Σ ( , ) ɛ ,
it i it





where the Outcome variable is the consequence under study (reporting quality, CEO turnover, CEO pay). Strong clawback equals one if
the ﬁrm has adopted a strong clawback, and zero if it has adopted a weak clawback. After equals one for ﬁrm-years after adoption and
zero for ﬁrm-years before adoption. Strong clawback×After is the interaction term of Strong clawback and After. The coeﬃcient β1
captures the diﬀerence between the two groups before clawback adoption. The coeﬃcient β2 captures the time trend for the control
group of weak adopters. β3, our coeﬃcient of interest, is the DiD estimator for the outcome variable following the adoption of strong
versus weak clawbacks. It captures the incremental eﬀect of adopting a strong clawback, relative to before the adoption and com-
pared to ﬁrms adopting a weak clawback.
Depending on the outcome measure under study, we include diﬀerent sets of control variables. To ensure reliable before and after
adoption analyses, we require the availability of at least two years of pre- and post-adoption period data. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. Factors such as asset structure, accounting practices, government regulation,
and industry competition may vary across industries. To account for these diﬀerences, we include indicator variables based on Fama-
French industry classiﬁcation codes in all models. To control for macroeconomic eﬀects, we also include year ﬁxed eﬀects. We use
standard errors clustered on both ﬁrm and time (Gow et al., 2010). In Panel A of Table A1 of the Appendix, we provide descriptive
statistics for all ﬁrm characteristics employed in our regressions on reporting quality (column 1), CEO turnover, and CEO pay (column
2).
Table 2 (continued)
Panel D: Covariate balance between the matched pairs of 249 strong and 249 weak clawback adopters
Board meetings 8.072 8.434 7.000 8.000 0.247 0.935 −0.104
Cash return 0.133 0.141 0.139 0.129 0.519 0.887 −0.058
CEO chair 0.526 0.534 1.000 1.000 0.858 1.000 −0.016
Chg. in acc. receivables 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.245 0.607 −0.104
Discretionary accruals 0.077 0.065 0.035 0.034 0.260 0.757 0.101
Independent directors 0.747 0.757 0.750 0.769 0.234 0.286 −0.107
Insider ownership 0.103 0.092 0.040 0.041 0.429 0.935 0.071
Institutional ownership 0.823 0.820 0.846 0.841 0.859 0.757 0.016
Leverage 0.226 0.228 0.214 0.204 0.920 0.398 −0.009
Loss 0.173 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.489 1.000 −0.062
Past restatement 0.056 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.369 1.000 −0.081
R&D 0.202 0.117 0.002 0.000 0.363 0.198 0.082
Return on assets 0.025 0.032 0.050 0.046 0.572 0.533 −0.051
Return volatility 0.028 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.763 0.887 −0.027
Sales growth 0.093 0.122 0.072 0.091 0.338 0.286 −0.086
Size 7.610 7.760 7.495 7.520 0.265 0.463 −0.100
Soft assets 0.568 0.541 0.616 0.568 0.211 0.107 0.112
Tobin's Q 1.750 1.777 1.409 1.320 0.812 0.162 −0.021
This table Panel A reports descriptive statistics on all ﬁrm characteristics employed in the propensity-score matching. Panel B reports the results of
the propensity-match ordered logit model. The ordered logit regressions are run separately for each year. All variables are measured in the year prior
to clawback adoption. The ﬁrst column provides the predicted signs of the variables. Column (2) reports the average coeﬃcient estimate across year-
speciﬁc estimation from 2007 through 2013. Column (3) reports an aggregated z-statistic, which is calculated as the sum of the individual annual z-
statistic divided by the square root of the number of years for which the propensity score model is estimated. This aggregated z-statistic assumes that
each annual estimation is independent of the other estimations. Column (4) reports the average marginal probability across year-speciﬁc estima-
tions. Columns (5) and (6) report the number of years for which the year-speciﬁc coeﬃcient is positive and negative, respectively. Adj. Pseudo R2 is
the average McFadden's [2000] adjusted pseudo R2. Standard errors are adjusted based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances. Panel C
presents statistics on the diﬀerences in propensity-scores between matched pairs of strong and weak clawback adopters. Panel D presents the test
statistics of covariate distributions for strong clawback adopters and weak clawback adopters. We show the p-values for a parametric t-test of the
diﬀerence in means in column (5) and a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of the diﬀerence between two distributions in column (6).
We bootstrap the KS-test with 2,000 bootstrap samples following Sekhon (2009). We also report normalized diﬀerences to assess the economic
signiﬁcance of reported diﬀerences in column (7). Normalized diﬀerences indicate the diﬀerence in means for strong and weak adopter groups
divided by the square root of the average of the group variances. A normalized diﬀerence of 0.25 or less indicates an acceptable balance (Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009). Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all variables are described in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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4. Results
4.1. Clawback strength and ﬁnancial reporting quality
We ﬁrst test whether clawback strength aﬀects reporting quality (H1). More speciﬁcally, we examine whether clawback strength
changes the likelihood of misstatements and restatements. Misstatement is an indicator variable that equals one for ﬁscal years with a
restatement and zero otherwise. Restatement is an indicator variable that equals one for the ﬁrst ﬁscal year in which improper
accounting later necessitated a restatement, and zero otherwise.
The univariate test statistics reported in Table 3, Panel A, show that strong adopters have a signiﬁcant decline in misstatement
rates from the pre- to the post-adoption period, while weak adopters have an insigniﬁcant increase over the same period. Conse-
quently, the DiD between strong and weak adopters is negative and highly signiﬁcant (−8.41%; p-value<0.01). We obtain qua-
litatively similar results for restatements (−3.71%; p-value<0.01).
Next, we estimate equation (Eq. (2)) using a logit model withMisstatement and Restatement as the dependent variables. We include
the same set of control variables as in the propensity-score model. Panel B of Table 3 presents the multivariate results. The coeﬃcient
estimates conﬁrm our ﬁndings of the univariate analyses. Although we ﬁnd no systematic diﬀerences in misstatement or restatement
rates between strong and weak clawback adopters before clawback adoption, we ﬁnd a (marginally signiﬁcant) positive time trend in
restatement rates for both strong and weak adopters. Most importantly, the DiD estimator Strong clawback×After is negative and
highly signiﬁcant in both theMisstatement and the Restatement equations (p-values< 0.01 and<0.05, respectively). Evaluated at the
means, the β3 coeﬃcient demonstrates a 10.2% (5.8%) reduction in the probability of a misstatement (restatement) for strong
clawback adopters compared to weak clawback adopters, between the pre- and post-periods. The sign of most control variables is in
line with prior research. For example, more levered and more complex ﬁrms have a lower ﬁnancial reporting quality, whereas
proﬁtability is positively associated with reporting quality.
However, these ﬁndings may reﬂect executives’ reluctance to ﬁle a restatement, instead of real improvements in reporting quality.
We deal with this concern by using six alternative measures of reporting quality employed in prior studies (Chan et al., 2012; deHaan
et al., 2013) that do not rely on restatements. First, we examine the disclosure of internal control weaknesses under SOX 302 and SOX
404 as an indicator for the eﬀectiveness of a ﬁrm's internal reporting process. Studies have shown that eﬀective internal controls are
associated with reporting quality (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007). We estimate equation (Eq. (2)) with a logit
model and employ the same covariates and sample as in the Misstatement and Restatement analyses. The dependent variable is either
SOX 302 or SOX 404. SOX 302 equals one if a ﬁrm has disclosed material internal control weaknesses and zero otherwise. SOX 404
equals one if a ﬁrm's independent auditor has identiﬁed material internal control weaknesses and zero otherwise.
Second, we study total Audit fees and Unexplained audit fees to proxy for auditors’ perception of the ﬁrms’ reporting quality and the
demand for monitoring of the ﬁnancial reporting process. Total annual audit fees capture the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and environmental forces
that can impact the overall transparency and riskiness of the ﬁnancial reporting process (Engel et al., 2010). In line with
Hribar et al. (2014), unexplained audit fees capture the auditor's legal and reputational costs associated with misstatements priced in
audit fees. We calculate Unexplained audit fees as the residual obtained from regressions of audit fees on a set of determinants. We
estimate equation (Eq. (2)) with an OLS model and use the natural logarithm of Audit fees, and Unexplained audit fees as dependent
variables. Descriptive statistics for all covariates used in these regressions are provided in column (1) in Panel B of Table A1 in the
Internet Appendix.
Third, we analyze a ﬁrm's meet/beat behavior. Observing a discontinuity of earnings distributions around analyst forecasts is
considered evidence of earnings management and ﬁnancial statement manipulation (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Burgstahler and Chuk,
2015). We estimate equation (Eq. (2)) with quarterly data using a logit model and Meet/Beat as the outcome variable. Meet/Beat is
equal to one if the ﬁrm has either no or a USD 0.01 deviation from the median of analyst earnings per share consensus forecast each
quarter, and zero otherwise.
Fourth, we examine the stock market perception of ﬁrms’ earnings quality. We study the market reaction on quarterly earnings
surprises around clawback adoption (earnings response coeﬃcient, ERC). Higher ERC magnitudes are positively associated with
investors’ assessment of reporting quality (Liu and Thomas, 2000). We present the descriptive statistics for all covariates employed in
the analyses of a ﬁrm's meet/beat behavior and its earnings response coeﬃcients in column (2) in Panel B of Table A1 in the Internet
Appendix.
Panel C of Table 3 presents the results of all additional tests. In all tests, we ﬁnd that strong clawback adopters, compared to weak
clawback adopters, signiﬁcantly improve their reporting quality, between the pre- and post-periods. In sum, our ﬁndings imply that
both auditors and investors perceive an improvement in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial statement quality following the adoption of a strong
clawback. This ﬁnding suggests that our main results are evidence of real improvements in reporting quality.
Both the univariate and multivariate results are consistent with our predictions. However, the interpretation of the improvements
in reporting quality is not straightforward. Under the isolated clawback explanation, a strong clawback increases the out-of-pocket
costs for CEOs following an accounting restatement. These costs, in addition to a potential dismissal, may prod executives to improve
reporting quality. Under the broader reform explanation, a strong clawback is part of a larger set of within-ﬁrm changes for reducing
overall reporting risk. This explanation suggests that our results reﬂect the eﬀect of a larger set of changes, not the purely causal eﬀect
of the strong clawback. Viewed collectively, all our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms adopt weak clawbacks for window-dressing purposes.
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Table 3
Eﬀect of clawback strength on reporting quality.
Panel A: Univariate tests for the eﬀect of clawback strength on misstatements and restatements
Before adoption After adoption Δ (After - Before) Before adoption After adoption Δ (After - Before)
(1) Misstatement (in %) (2) Restatement (in %)
N 1,677 1,258 2,935 1,677 1,258 2,935
Strong clawback 1,474 10.68 4.50 −6.18*** 4.93 1.61 −3.32***
Weak clawback 1,461 12.24 14.47 2.23 5.58 5.97 0.39
Δ (Strong - Weak) 2,935 −1.56 −9.97*** −8.41*** −0.65 −4.36*** −3.71***
Rosenbaum Γ 1.63 2.31
Panel B: Multivariate tests for the eﬀect of clawback strength on misstatements and restatements
(1) Misstatement (2) Restatement
Coef. Marg. prob. Coef. Marg. prob.
Strong clawback −0.228 −0.020 −0.116 −0.005
(−0.96) (−0.45)
After 0.317 0.028 0.389* 0.016
(1.54) (1.88)
Strong clawback × After −1.169*** −0.102 −1.374** −0.058
(−3.34) (−2.51)
Audit committee size 0.077 0.007 0.163** 0.007
(1.49) (2.17)
Board meetings −0.035 −0.003 −0.043 −0.002
(−1.54) (−1.50)
Cash return −0.117 −0.010 2.947* 0.124
(−0.13) (1.87)
CEO chair −0.303* −0.026 −0.045 −0.002
(−1.84) (−0.41)
Chg. in acc. receivables 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(1.06) (0.61)
Discretionary accruals 0.08 0.007 −0.519 −0.022
(0.14) (−0.47)
Independent directors −0.957 −0.084 −2.425** −0.102
(−0.86) (−2.48)
Insider ownership 0.743 0.065 0.513 0.022
(1.33) (0.85)
Institutional ownership 0.256 0.022 0.164 0.007
(0.36) (0.30)
Leverage 1.234*** 0.108 1.615*** 0.068
(3.19) (3.25)
Loss −0.165 −0.014 0.353 0.015
(−0.76) (1.20)
R&D 0.748*** 0.065 0.617*** 0.026
(3.33) (2.66)
Past restatement 0.093 0.008 0.126 0.005
(0.62) (0.86)
Return on assets −1.742*** −0.152 −2.741*** −0.115
(−4.29) (−4.02)
Return volatility 7.583 0.663 −0.236 −0.010
(0.60) (−0.01)
Sales growth 0.043 0.004 0.126 0.005
(0.61) (1.57)
Size −0.124 −0.011 −0.175 −0.007
(−1.46) (−1.40)
Soft assets 0.246 0.022 −0.339 −0.014
(0.52) (−0.91)




Year & industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
(continued on next page)
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4.2. Clawback strength and CEO turnover
We next examine whether clawback strength has an impact on CEO turnover (H2). Column (1) in Panel A of Table 4 presents the
univariate test statistics. We ﬁnd that turnover rates signiﬁcantly decrease from the pre- to the post-adoption period for strong clawback
adopters (−3.89%, p-value<0.05), while they remain relatively stable for weak adopters (−0.34%, p-value>0.10). Consequently, the
DiD between strong and weak adopters and between the pre- and post-periods is signiﬁcantly negative (−3.55%, p-value<0.05).
We ﬁnd similar results in a multivariate setting. In addition to the set of covariates used in the propensity-score model, we control for
CEO age, Share return, and Underperformance. Column (1) in Panel B of Table 4 presents the multivariate results and shows a signiﬁcantly
negative coeﬃcient on Strong clawback×After (p-value<0.01). Evaluated at the means, the marginal probability for the likelihood of a
CEO turnover is 4.0% lower for strong adopters than for weak adopters, between the pre- and post-adoption periods.
These results are consistent with our predictions for reporting quality (H1). A potential compensation recoupment increases the
costs to CEOs if they are dismissed following accounting manipulations. As these costs are higher for strong clawbacks than for weak
clawbacks, strong clawbacks are more eﬀective in motivating CEOs to report truthfully and are thus associated with fewer turnovers.
4.3. Clawback strength and CEO pay
We now explore whether clawback strength has an impact on CEO pay (H3). We measure CEO pay using the natural logarithms of
CEO total pay, CEO non-incentive pay (the sum of salary and other compensation), and CEO incentive pay (the sum of bonus, options,
grants, and non-equity incentive pay).
Table 3 (continued)
Panel B: Multivariate tests for the eﬀect of clawback strength on misstatements and restatements
Observations 2,935 2,935
Pseudo R2 10.40% 10.60%
Panel C: Multivariate tests for the eﬀect of clawback strength on other reporting quality measures
SOX 302 SOX 404 Audit fees Unexplained audit fees Meet/ beat ERC
Strong clawback 0.105 0.410 −0.003 −0.003 0.112 0.001
(1.52) (0.96) (−0.09) (−0.08) (1.42) (0.45)
After 0.077 −0.267 0.052 0.045 0.168 0.004**
(0.45) (−1.30) (1.76) (1.46) (1.51) (2.01)
Strong clawback × After −0.390** −0.901* −0.027* −0.042** −0.160** −0.006
(−2.18) (−1.77) (−1.84) (−2.03) (−2.34) (−1.56)
Earnings surprise (ES) 0.770***
(3.25)
ES × Str. claw. × After 1.095***
(2.71)
ES × Strong clawback −0.393
(−1.39)
ES × After −0.108
(−0.56)
Controls and year/quarter & industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,935 2,935 3,367 3,315 6,479 6,349
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 7.49% 15.80% 79.95% 11.30% 13.30% 7.50%
This table presents tests for adopting strong vs. weak clawbacks on ﬁnancial reporting quality measures. Strong adopters are propensity-matched to
weak adopters, resulting in 249 matched pairs. Panel A reports univariate two-tailed test statistics for diﬀerences in means on the likelihood of
accounting misstatements and restatements based on the sample used in the multivariate analysis. We require the availability of at least two years of
pre- and post-adoption data. We also report, when applicable, the Rosenbaum Γ to quantify the amount of hidden bias necessary to alter the
statistical signiﬁcance (p=0.10) in univariate tests that results from the assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an
equal probability of receiving treatment. Panel B presents multivariate tests (Logit regressions). Panel C analyzes further proxies for reporting
quality. In logit regressions on SOX 302 and SOX 404 we use the same control variables as in our regressions on misstatements and restatements. In
OLS regressions on (unexplained) audit fees we include the following control variables: audit committee size, BIG4, board meetings, cash return,
current ratio, debt issuance, discretionary accruals, extraordinary items, foreign sales, independent directors, insider ownership, institutional
ownership, inventory, leverage, loss, past restatement, receivables, R&D, return on assets, return volatility, sales growth, seasoned equity oﬀerings
(SEO), size, and Tobin's q. In the Logit [OLS] regressions on Meet/Beat frequency [two-days cumulative abnormal returns around quarterly earnings
announcements] we use quarterly data and control for the following factors: Altman z-score, [only in regression on meet/beat frequency: audit
committee size], [board meetings], book-to-market, cash return, capital intensity, [CEO chair], discretionary accruals, downward revision, earnings
growth, [earnings surprise], fourth ﬁscal quarter, [independent directors], [insider ownership], [institutional ownership], leverage, loss, nonlinear
median estimate, number of estimates, past meet/beat, past restatement, return on assets, return volatility, sales growth, size, shares outstanding,
soft assets, and write-oﬀs. We refer to Table A4 in the Internet Appendix for descriptive statistics of all covariates employed in our regressions.
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the
year- and ﬁrm-level. Z-/T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 4
Eﬀect of clawback strength on CEO turnover and CEO pay.
Panel A: Univariate tests for the eﬀect of clawback strength on CEO turnover and CEO pay
Before adoption After adoption Δ (After -Before) Before adoption After adoption Δ (After -Before)
(1) CEO turnover (in %) (2) CEO total pay
N 1,355 1,086 2,441 1,355 1,086 2,441
Strong clawback 1,217 11.97 8.08 −3.89** 8.28 8.56 0.27***
Weak clawback 1,224 10.45 10.11 −0.34 8.18 8.62 0.45***
Δ (Strong - Weak) 2,441 1.52 −2.03 −3.55** 0.11* −0.07 −0.18**
Rosenbaum Γ 1.43 1.37
(3) CEO non-incentive pay (4) CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 1,217 6.77 6.93 0.16*** 7.85 8.22 0.38***
Weak clawback 1,224 6.74 6.95 0.21*** 7.61 8.25 0.64***
Δ (Strong - Weak) 2,441 0.03 −0.02 −0.05 0.24** −0.02 −0.26**
Rosenbaum Γ n.a. 1.29
Panel B: Multivariate tests for the eﬀect of clawback strength on CEO turnover and compensation
(1) CEO turnover (2) CEO total pay (3) CEO non-incentive pay (4) CEO incentive pay
Coef. Marg. Prob.
Strong clawback 0.237 0.019 0.078 −0.017 0.181
(1.55) (0.96) (−0.35) (1.35)
After −0.096 −0.008 0.165 0.051 0.204
(−0.43) (1.46) (0.60) (1.61)
Strong clawback × After −0.495*** −0.040 −0.175** −0.015 −0.239**
(−2.69) (−2.05) (−0.24) (−1.98)
Audit committee size 0.060 0.005 −0.001 0.014 −0.029
(0.90) (−0.02) (0.85) (−1.10)
Board meetings 0.061* 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.015
(1.87) (0.62) (0.11) (1.17)
Cash ﬂow 1.023 0.082 −1.604 −2.491* −1.655
(0.91) (−0.76) (−1.76) (−0.60)
CEO age −0.072*** −0.006
(−4.53)
CEO chair −1.289*** −0.104 0.071 −0.028 −0.008
(−7.41) (1.21) (−0.51) (−0.09)
CEO tenure 0.048* 0.095*** 0.028
(1.84) (4.22) (0.58)
Chg. In acc. receivables −0.001 −0.000 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003**
(−1.03) (−1.61) (−1.33) (−2.20)
Discretionary accruals 0.167 0.013 0.073 −0.035 0.107
(0.15) (0.53) (−0.27) (0.50)
Independent directors −2.063*** −0.166 0.080 0.537** 0.469
(−3.92) (0.23) (2.13) (0.78)
Insider ownership 0.039 0.003 −0.361 −0.084 −1.211***
(0.04) (−1.44) (−0.35) (−2.63)
Institutional ownership −0.333 −0.027 0.510** 0.060 0.834***
(−0.63) (2.30) (0.39) (2.78)
Leverage 0.299 0.024 −0.155 −0.013 −0.205
(0.71) (−0.70) (−0.09) (−0.52)
Loss 0.304 0.025 −0.059 −0.136* −0.136
(0.98) (−0.48) (−1.74) (−0.73)
Past restatement 0.145 0.012 −0.092 −0.090 −0.092
(1.04) (−1.01) (−1.61) (−0.75)
Return on assets −2.070*** −0.167 2.017 3.183** 2.648
(−3.77) (0.94) (2.16) (0.86)
Return volatility 1.656 0.133 −2.142 −2.949 −4.599
(0.13) (−0.66) (−1.36) (−0.82)
Sales growth −0.838 −0.068 0.036 −0.032 0.116*
(−0.81) (1.09) (−0.53) (1.66)
Size 0.108 0.009 0.389*** 0.159*** 0.508***
(1.34) (8.70) (5.72) (9.40)
Share return −0.008 −0.001 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.007***
(−0.49) (5.19) (3.86) (5.15)
Soft assets −0.459 −0.037 0.240 0.317** 0.140
(−0.86) (1.14) (2.13) (0.39)
Tobin's Q 0.002 0.000 0.086** −0.052** 0.118*
(0.02) (2.27) (−2.02) (1.90)
Underperformance 0.317* 0.026 −0.114*** 0.014 −0.254***
(continued on next page)
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Columns (2–4) in Panel A of Table 4 present the univariate test statistics. We ﬁnd that CEO pay increases over time both for strong
and weak clawback adopters (p-values< 0.01). While total and incentive pay is signiﬁcantly higher for strong clawback adopters
before clawback adoption, pay is lower in the post-adoption period compared to weak adopters. Consequently, the DiD between
strong and weak adopters and between the pre- and post-adoption periods are signiﬁcantly negative for CEO total pay and CEO
incentive pay (p-values< 0.05). The decline corresponds to a decrease of USD 1.20m in total pay and a USD 1.30m decrease in
incentive pay. The DiD is negative but not signiﬁcant for CEO Non-incentive pay.
We then test for the relationship between clawback strength and compensation in a multivariate setting. We estimate equation (2)
using an OLS model, include the same set of covariates as in the propensity-score model, and also control for CEO tenure, Share return,
and Underperformance. Columns (2–4) in Panel B of Table 4 present the multivariate results. The coeﬃcients on Strong claw-
back×After are signiﬁcantly negative (p-value< 0.05) in the regressions on CEO total pay and CEO incentive pay. Evaluated at the
means, the β3 coeﬃcient shows a 17.5% (23.9%) reduction in total (incentive) CEO pay for strong clawback adopters compared to
weak clawback adopters, between the pre- and post-adoption periods.
Under the isolated clawback explanation (H3a), we expect an increase in pay to induce the CEO to exert eﬀort due to the increase in
expected costs that stem from non-controllable reporting risk. Observing a decrease in incentive pay contradicts the isolated clawback
explanation but is in line with the broader reform explanation (H3b). Therefore, our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms adopt strong clawbacks
simultaneously with other actions to reduce expected costs associated with both controllable and non-controllable reporting risk.
4.4. Clawback adopters versus non-clawback adopters
In a last set of tests, we also separately compare strong (weak) clawback adopters to a matched set of ﬁrms that do not adopt
clawbacks at all. We therefore match strong (weak) adopters to non-adopters based on the estimated propensity-scores from our
ordered logistic regression model, as presented in Table 2. The benchmark group now comprises ﬁrms that had a similar propensity
for adopting a strong (weak) clawback but did not do so. We assign non-adopters the adoption year of their matched pair. We present
further information on diﬀerences in propensity-scores between strong (weak) adopters and non-adopters, covariate balances, and
descriptive statistics in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Table 5 shows that the ﬁrm-level outcomes are concentrated only in the sample of strong adopters. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvements
in reporting quality, fewer CEO turnovers, and less total, and non-incentive pay for strong clawback adopters compared to non-adopters,
between the pre- and post-adoption periods (panel A). The statistical signiﬁcance of our results is similar to our main results, while the
magnitude of the eﬀects is smaller for most consequences. However, when we compare weak adopters to non-adopters (panel B), our DiD
estimator is insigniﬁcant for all outcome variables. This ﬁnding indicates the adoption of weak clawbacks for window-dressing purposes.
5. Robustness tests
5.1. Sensitivity to hidden bias
Propensity-score matching and the inclusion of an extensive set of covariates can reduce—but does not necessarily eliminate—the
potential for omitted variable bias in our regressions. To assess the sensitivity of our results to omitted variables bias, we adopt an
approach developed by Rosenbaum (2002).
Rosenbaum (2002) addresses the selection bias resulting from a potential correlation between unobserved covariates and
clawback strength. This approach quantiﬁes how strongly an unobserved covariate must inﬂuence the selection process to either
nullify or reverse our results. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that relaxing the assumption that two observations with identical observable
covariates have an identical probability of receiving treatment can be used for calculating signiﬁcance test boundaries. These
Table 4 (continued)
Panel B: Multivariate tests for the eﬀect of clawback strength on CEO turnover and compensation
(1) CEO turnover (2) CEO total pay (3) CEO non-incentive pay (4) CEO incentive pay
Coef. Marg. Prob.
(1.67) (−5.52) (0.55) (−4.27)
Constant 1.824 3.558*** 3.812*** 0.221
(1.11) (6.86) (11.75) (0.20)
Year & industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,441 2,441 2, 441 2, 441
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 15.60% 38.81% 31.30% 29.80%
This table presents tests for adopting strong vs. weak clawbacks on the likelihood of CEO turnover and on CEO pay. Strong adopters are propensity-
matched to weak adopters, resulting in 249 matched pairs. Panel A reports univariate two-tailed test statistics for diﬀerences in means based on the
sample we use for our multivariate analysis. We also report, when applicable, the Rosenbaum Γ to quantify the amount of hidden bias necessary to
alter the statistical signiﬁcance (p=0.10) in univariate tests that results from the assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores
have an equal probability of receiving treatment. Panel B presents multivariate tests (Logit and OLS regressions). We refer to Table A4 in the Internet
Appendix for descriptive statistics of all covariates employed in our regressions. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all
variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the year- and ﬁrm-level. Z-/T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *
denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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boundaries indicate how strong the hidden bias must be for changing the qualitative inferences from a study. The larger the boundary
value Γ, the more robust our inferences are to a potential hidden bias.
We follow Hoitash et al. (2016) and assess the sensitivity of the diﬀerence in outcome variables between strong and weak
clawback adopters, based on the bounds of the Hodges-Lehmann (HL) point estimate of the average treatment eﬀect. We do so by
obtaining the critical Γ-value for which the upper and lower bounds for the HL estimate bracket zero, indicating an insigniﬁcant
treatment eﬀect among strong and weak adopters.
We present the Rosenbaum bound, where applicable, in panel A of Tables 3 and 4. The smallest Γ-value for the six outcome
variables is 1.29 (CEO Incentive pay), and the largest Γ-value is 2.31 (Restatement). While there is no objective benchmark for de-
termining whether a given Γ-value is large or small (Armstrong et al., 2010, p. 253), our Γ-values are in line with or even larger than
the reported Rosenbaum bounds in Armstrong et al. (2010) and Hoitash et al. (2016). However, as our results are sensitive to
Table 5
Clawback adopters versus non-clawback adopters.
Panel A: Multivariate tests for matched pairs of strong clawback adopters and non-adopters
Misstatement Restatement CEO turnover
Strong clawback 0.365 0.425 −0.021
(1.64) (1.02) (−0.19)
After 0.205 −0.420 −0.131
(0.63) (−1.00) (−0.77)
Strong clawback × After −1.217*** −1.058** −0.389***
(−3.89) (−2.51) (−2.63)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 3,324 3,324 2,595
Pseudo R2 11.10% 11.70% 16.70%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 0.099 0.043 0.251*
(1.46) (0.93) (1.85)
After 0.001 0.0678 −0.030
(0.02) (1.63) (−0.20)
Strong clawback × After −0.105* −0.078* −0.138
(−1.89) (−1.82) (−1.05)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,600 2,600 2,600
Adjusted R2 47.77% 34.55% 30.85%
Panel B: Multivariate tests for matched pairs of weak clawback adopters and non-adopters
Misstatement Restatement CEO turnover
Weak clawback 0.099 0.207 0.213
(0.47) (1.02) (1.01)
After 0.473* 0.199 0.217
(1.78) (0.71) (0.84)
Weak clawback × After 0.022 0.186 −0.405
(0.09) (0.51) (−1.41)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 3,228 3,228 2,504
Pseudo R2 8.28% 6.70% 14.70%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Weak clawback 0.030 0.008 0.037
(0.36) (0.13) (0.26)
After 0.077 0.043 0.137
(0.78) (0.84) (0.88)
Weak clawback × After 0.098 0.077 0.152
(1.07) (1.07) (1.15)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,522 2,522 2,522
Adjusted R2 38.50% 29.30% 28.40%
Panel A (Panel B) reports results when strong (weak) clawback adopters are propensity-matched to non-adopters using the estimated propensity
scores from our ordered logistic regression model as presented in Table 2. Table A2 in the Appendix presents covariate balance and descriptive
statistics. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to clustering
at the year- and ﬁrm-level. Z-/T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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unobserved heterogeneity, we acknowledge that one should interpret them with caution.7
5.2. Clawback strength, compensation, and past restatements
Our Clawback Strength Index captures a concept that is abstract and latent rather than concrete and observable. Therefore, one
possible concern is the extent to which we actually measure what we want to measure. The ideal way of validating our index would
be to show a higher incidence of recoupment for strong adopters than for weak adopters following a triggering event. Unfortunately,
this eﬀort is fraught with sample size challenges because ﬁrms are not mandated to publicly disclose their clawback actions.8 We
therefore focus only on ﬁrms that have ﬁled a restatement. We then augment our basic model by adding a new variable, Past
restatement× Strong clawback×After, in the regressions on CEO total pay, CEO non-incentive pay, and CEO incentive pay. The triple
interaction term is equal to one for years in which ﬁrms have adopted a strong clawback, and after they have ﬁled a restatement.
Table 6 reports the results. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction in total and incentive pay for strong clawback adopters compared to
weak clawback adopters, between the pre- and post-adoption periods. Our results show that ﬁrms with strong clawbacks lower pay
after restatements. One explanation is that this reduction is due to the strong clawback: Firms report current year pay minus any
clawback amount. Another explanation is that the drop is a reduction in pay, because ﬁrms that adopt strong clawbacks have tougher
boards that are more committed to ﬁnancial reporting integrity. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd our results comforting in that executives in
ﬁrms with strong clawbacks experience a reduction in pay following earnings restatements.
5.3. Further robustness tests
We conduct the following robustness tests. First, we use the full sample of clawback adopters without matching strong to weak
adopters. While this approach uses a much larger sample, it has the disadvantage that we do not control for a potential self-selection
into adopting a strong or weak clawback or no clawback. We present the results in Table A3 in the Appendix. Our ﬁndings remain
qualitatively similar, while the coeﬃcients on Strong clawback×After are generally smaller in magnitude.
Second, we study the sensitivity of our results to alternative constructions of our index. We assume that the overall clawback is
stronger, when (a) boards have less discretion as to whether to invoke the clawback, and when (b) the clawback is not triggered by
misconduct. Therefore, we assign a greater weight to the misconduct hurdle (Table A4, Panel A), use a multiplicative version of our
Clawback Strength Index (Table A4, Panel B), and exclude non-ﬁnancial triggers from the Trigger sub-index (Table A4, Panel C). We
also consider an alternative index and exclude the Employee Coverage sub-index from the overall Clawback Strength Index. The as-
sumption is that some of the elements of the Employee Coverage sub-index do not strengthen the CEO's clawback but reduce the non-
controllable reporting risk (Table A4, Panel D). Finally, we reconstruct the Clawback Strength Index by classifying strong and weak
adopters through using alternative cut-oﬀ points at the yearly 75th/25th percentile of the index distribution, rather than the yearly
median (Table A4, Panel E). In all of these robustness tests, our inferences remain qualitatively similar.
Table 6
Clawback strength, compensation, and past restatements.
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback −0.013 −0.106 0.121
(−0.14) (−1.55) (0.95)
After 0.159* 0.026 0.195
(1.87) (0.37) (1.46)
Strong clawback × After −0.268** −0.059 −0.579***
(−2.19) (−0.31) (−2.59)
Past restatement −0.003 0.000 0.008
(−0.07) (0.02) (0.11)
Past restatement × Strong clawback × After −0.244* −0.036 −0.348**
(−1.77) (−0.26) (−2.00)
Controls, year & industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,327 1,327 1,327
Adjusted R2 40.50% 36.30% 37.20%
This table reports estimation results of the eﬀect of adopting a strong vs. a weak clawback on the level of CEO total, non-incentive, and incentive pay
conditional on ﬁling a restatement. The sample contains only ﬁrms that have ﬁled a restatement. Strong adopters are propensity-matched to weak
adopters. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to clustering
at the year- and ﬁrm-level. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
7 We also adopt an approach developed by Hosman et al. (2010) to assess a potential omitted variables bias. All details and results are presented in Internet
Appendix C. We report that, in the majority of cases, our coeﬃcient estimates are robust to various scenarios of omitted covariates.
8 Internet Appendix A summarizes all SEC enforced clawback cases and illustrates the out-of-pocket costs for executives due to clawback enforcement.
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6. Conclusion
In this study, we draw on ﬁrms’ freedom to draft voluntarily adopted clawback provisions. To explore the cross-sectional variation
in clawbacks, we study the design of 4,464 clawback provisions and propose a Clawback Strength Index. Our index conﬁrms that some
ﬁrms adopt strong and substantive provisions, whereas other ﬁrms adopt weak ones.
We show that, following clawback adoption, strong clawback adopters in comparison with weak clawback adopters experience
signiﬁcant improvements in ﬁnancial reporting quality, a decrease in the likelihood of CEO turnover, and a decrease in both total and
incentive-based CEO pay. Moreover, we ﬁnd similar results when comparing strong adopters to a sample of non-adopters, whereas we
ﬁnd no beneﬁcial changes when comparing weak adopters to a sample of non-adopters.
Our ﬁndings for ﬁnancial reporting quality and CEO turnover reveal that if clawbacks have causal eﬀects, then these eﬀects stem
from clawback strength, not from clawback adoption per se. Furthermore, the improvements in reporting quality and the fewer CEO
turnovers can also reﬂect the eﬀect of a broader reform in which ﬁrms adopt strong clawbacks, along with other measures, to reduce
overall reporting risk stemming from factors outside the CEO's immediate control. This reduction removes the necessity of increasing
compensation after clawback adoption and explains our ﬁndings on CEO pay.
Our study provides ﬁrst evidence of the diﬀerential economic consequences across voluntary clawback adopters. Viewed col-
lectively, our results conﬁrm that not all clawbacks are the same: Some clawbacks lead to signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts, while others
do not. We therefore contribute to a richer understanding of the economic consequences of clawback adoption. An important im-
plication of our study is that one may need to reinterpret the results of prior clawback studies, which ﬁnd beneﬁcial eﬀects of
clawback adoption and attribute these eﬀects causally to merely adopting a clawback. This interpretation overlooks the variation in
clawback design and the notion that governance mechanisms interact in potentially important ways (Denis, 2001, 2012), thereby
omitting the beneﬁcial impact of concomitant governance changes that are embedded in a broader reform. From this perspective, the
eﬀect sizes attributed by prior literature to clawback adoption may be upward biased.
Our study also contributes to the literature on the voluntary initiation of corporate governance mechanisms in general. While
researchers are able to observe the adoption of such mechanisms, they are generally unable to observe the underlying motives for the
adoption. Our approach of studying the design of governance mechanisms and of diﬀerentiating between weak and strong designs
can help future researchers make useful inferences about ﬁrms’ motives for the adoption of governance tools. More speciﬁcally, the
existence of two diﬀerent types of clawbacks suggests the initiation of such provisions for either window-dressing purposes or
substantial reasons. Future research will likely ﬁnd it fruitful to pay more attention to the design of governance tools when making
inferences about ﬁrms’ motives for their adoption.
Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, we cannot rule out the possibility that boards adopt strong clawbacks
merely to signal their greater commitment to improving reporting quality. Given that SOX already introduced a clawback provision
long before our sample ﬁrms have chosen to adopt their own provisions supports this signaling argument. Thus, clawbacks may not
have any eﬀects and ﬁrms only adopt them to signal the boards’ commitment to better reporting quality (Denis, 2012). However,
whereas many of the ﬁrms’ actions to reduce reporting risk and the board's level of oversight are not observable (Laux and
Laux, 2009), the adoption of a strong clawback is. Observing the strength of a clawback is therefore meaningful, because it reveals
important information that is otherwise not visible to shareholders.
Second, and related to the diﬃculty of observing ﬁrms’ actions towards improving their reporting, we are not able to provide
conclusive evidence that ﬁrms adopt strong clawbacks as part of a broader reform. Because most of the components of the reform can
vary across time and ﬁrms, not only capturing them in the cross-section but also, and consequently, assessing the speciﬁc contribution
of the clawback to the overall eﬀect is diﬃcult. Nonetheless, by analyzing the eﬀect of clawback strength on CEO pay, we can
distinguish between the isolated clawback and the broader reform explanation. The decrease in CEO pay, together with the uniformly
strong improvements in reporting quality following the adoption of a strong clawback, suggests that diﬀerences in clawback design
reﬂect diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ motivation for reducing reporting risk. Thus our overall set of results favors the broader reform ex-
planation: Firms that care a great deal about their reporting are likely to adopt strong clawbacks as part of a broader reform.
Third, our model assumes that non-controllable reporting risk is not aﬀected by clawback adoption. However, CEOs exposed to a
strong clawback may themselves initiate governance mechanisms to reduce non-controllable reporting risk. Under this scenario, the
broader reform package is adopted in response to the clawback, thereby strengthening the importance of adopting a clawback in
isolation. However, if CEOs exert more eﬀort to further decrease non-controllable reporting risk, one would expect an increase in CEO
pay. Our results are the opposite, lending support to the broader reform explanation.
These limitations notwithstanding, our ﬁndings also have implications for shareholders and regulators. Given that the mere
adoption of clawbacks does not warrant better reporting quality, one must be cautious about assuming that mandating clawback
provisions under Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act will be beneﬁcial. Moreover, even if Section 954 will eventually require the
design of strong clawbacks, it is not clear that ﬁrms that have chosen to adopt a weak clawback or no clawback at all will be as
diligent in enforcing them as ﬁrms that have chosen to adopt a strong clawback. It also remains unclear whether the CEOs of non- or
weak adopters will improve reporting quality as eﬀectively as the CEOs of strong adopters. Future research could reexamine the
eﬀectiveness of clawback provisions by comparing the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory adoption.




Panel A: Descriptive statistics for analyses of misstatement, restatement, CEO turnover, and CEO pay
(1) Misstatement and restatement analysis (2) CEO turnover and CEO pay analysis
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Audit committee size 4.932 5.000 2.837 5.130 5.000 2.868
Board meetings 8.071 7.000 3.391 7.912 7.000 3.229
Cash return 0.146 0.139 0.111 0.158 0.144 0.097
CEO age 55.957 56.000 6.740
CEO chair 0.543 1.000 0.498 0.576 1.000 0.494
CEO tenure 7.555 5.808 6.558
Chg. in acc. receivables 0.008 0.005 0.036 0.008 0.005 0.035
Discretionary accruals 0.063 0.030 0.101 0.061 0.029 0.100
Independent directors 0.753 0.765 0.086 0.755 0.765 0.084
Insider ownership 0.080 0.036 0.129 0.071 0.034 0.116
Institutional ownership 0.827 0.843 0.169 0.840 0.849 0.153
Leverage 0.222 0.208 0.178 0.211 0.202 0.162
Loss 0.166 0.000 0.372 0.132 0.000 0.338
Past restatement 0.067 0.000 0.250 0.061 0.000 0.239
R&D 0.081 0.002 0.530 0.047 0.003 0.146
Return on assets 0.040 0.052 0.114 0.051 0.056 0.100
Return volatility 0.027 0.024 0.013 0.025 0.023 0.012
Sales growth 0.093 0.070 0.274 0.081 0.067 0.226
Size 7.881 7.676 1.487 8.035 7.839 1.468
Share return 0.048 −0.192 8.111
Soft assets 0.569 0.604 0.227 0.576 0.611 0.220
Tobin's Q 1.719 1.392 1.089 1.721 1.411 1.060
Underperformance 0.635 1.000 0.481
Number of observations 2,935 2,441
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for analyses of (unexplained) audit fees, meet/beat and ERC
(1) (Unexplained) audit fees (2) Meet/beat and ERC
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Altman Z-score 2.478 1.921 3.786
Audit committee size 4.910 5.000 2.618 5.245 5.000 3.132
BIG 4 0.950 1.000 0.218
Board meetings 7.917 7.000 3.290 8.142 7.000 3.356
Book-to-market 0.563 0.503 0.444
Capital intensity 5.371 2.193 20.387
Cash return 0.149 0.140 0.111 0.027 0.026 0.046
CEO chair 0.551 1.000 0.498
Current ratio 2.242 1.834 1.521
Debt issuance 0.337 0.000 0.473
Discretionary accruals 0.061 0.031 0.096 0.061 0.028 0.104
Downward revision 0.315 0.000 0.465
Earnings growth 0.539 1.000 0.499
Earnings surprise 0.000 0.001 0.041
Extraordinary items 0.024 0.000 0.152
Foreign sales 0.212 0.074 2.656
Fourth ﬁscal quarter 0.267 0.000 0.443
Independent directors 0.764 0.773 0.091 0.764 0.778 0.089
Insider ownership 0.082 0.037 0.130 0.075 0.030 0.134
Institutional ownership 0.820 0.837 0.171 0.801 0.820 0.164
Inventory 4.774 5.153 2.217
Leverage 0.219 0.205 0.174 0.249 0.237 0.188
Loss 0.156 0.000 0.363 0.168 0.000 0.374
Nonlinear median 0.000 0.000 0.075
Number of estimates 12.224 10.000 7.983
Past meet-beat 0.642 1.000 0.479
Past restatement 0.064 0.000 0.246 0.063 0.000 0.242
Receivables 5.502 5.590 1.688
R&D 0.077 0.003 0.496
(continued on next page)
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Table A1 (continued)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for analyses of (unexplained) audit fees, meet/beat and ERC
Return on assets 0.043 0.053 0.110 0.011 0.013 0.058
Return volatility 0.026 0.023 0.012 0.041 0.031 0.035
Sales growth 0.132 0.081 0.754 0.032 0.016 0.378
SEO 0.050 0.000 0.218
Size 7.897 7.695 1.471 8.141 8.090 1.539
Shares 4.734 4.561 1.254
Soft assets 0.281 0.320 0.387
Tobin's Q 1.767 1.415 1.133
Write-oﬀ 0.484 0.000 0.500
Number of observations 3,367 6,479
Column (1) of Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the matched sample of strong clawback adopters vs. weak clawback adopters for the analyses
of misstatements and restatements. Of the 2,935 observations, 1,474 (1,461) belong to strong (weak) clawback adopters, and 1,677 (1,258) to
before (after) clawback adoption. Column (2) of Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the analyses of CEO turnover and CEO pay. Of the 2,441
observations, 1,217 (1,224) belong to strong (weak) clawback adopters, and 1,355 (1,086) to before (after) clawback adoption.
Column (1) of Panel B presents descriptive statistics of the matched sample of strong clawback adopters vs. weak clawback adopters for the analyses
of (unexplained) audit fees. Of the 3,367 observations, 1,711 (1,656) belong to strong (weak) clawback adopters, and 2,181 (1,186) to before (after)
clawback adoption. Column (2) of Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the analyses of meet/beat behavior and the ERC analysis. Of the 6,479
observations, 3,328 (3,151) belong to strong (weak) clawback adopters, and 3,561 (2,918) to before (after) clawback adoption.
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%, and all variables are described in Appendix A.
Table A2
Matching strong (weak) clawback adopters to non-adopters.
Panel A: Diﬀerences in propensity-scores for matched pairs
Matched pairs Mean SD Min. Median Max
Strong vs. Non 299 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.029
Weak vs. Non 287 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.029
Panel B: Covariate balance between the matched pairs of 299 strong and 299 non-clawback adopters
Mean strong Mean non Median strong Median non t-test diﬀ. p-value KS boot-strap diﬀ. p-value Norm. diﬀ.
Audit comm. size 5.080 5.044 5.000 5.000 0.818 0.651 0.019
Board meetings 8.044 8.171 7.000 7.000 0.660 0.999 −0.036
Cash return 0.132 0.134 0.134 0.137 0.848 0.515 −0.016
CEO chair 0.495 0.508 0.000 1.000 0.744 1.000 −0.027
Chg. in acc. rec. 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.585 0.846 −0.045
Discretionary acc. 0.070 0.073 0.036 0.038 0.748 0.515 −0.026
Independent dir. 0.742 0.746 0.750 0.750 0.569 0.582 −0.047
Insider ownership 0.111 0.108 0.048 0.053 0.781 0.719 0.023
Institutional own. 0.810 0.809 0.832 0.863 0.968 0.145 0.003
Leverage 0.231 0.224 0.212 0.208 0.663 0.393 0.036
Loss 0.181 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.469 1.000 −0.059
Past restatement 0.054 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.397 1.000 −0.069
R&D 0.178 0.115 0.004 0.000 0.412 0.651 0.067
Return on assets 0.026 0.026 0.044 0.044 0.991 0.785 −0.001
Return volatility 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.973 0.846 0.003
Sales growth 0.073 0.098 0.066 0.062 0.378 0.582 −0.072
Size 7.266 7.262 7.287 7.174 0.970 0.582 0.003
Soft assets 0.558 0.562 0.588 0.599 0.845 0.970 −0.016
Tobin's Q 1.770 1.740 1.397 1.412 0.757 0.719 0.025
Panel C: Covariate balance between the matched pairs of 287 weak and 287 non-clawback adopters
Mean strong Mean non Median strong Median non t-test diﬀ. p-value KS boot-strap diﬀ. p-value Norm. diﬀ.
Audit comm. size 4.781 4.896 4.000 5.000 0.453 0.828 −0.063
Board meetings 8.101 8.077 7.000 7.000 0.935 0.489 0.007
Cash return 0.140 0.138 0.134 0.137 0.904 0.625 0.010
CEO chair 0.512 0.495 1.000 0.000 0.677 1.000 0.035
(continued on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
Panel C: Covariate balance between the matched pairs of 287 weak and 287 non-clawback adopters
Chg. in acc. rec. 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.649 0.764 0.038
Discretionary acc. 0.067 0.081 0.037 0.042 0.147 0.625 −0.121
Independent dir. 0.738 0.737 0.750 0.750 0.896 0.556 0.011
Insider ownership 0.122 0.109 0.054 0.053 0.288 0.930 0.089
Institutional own. 0.805 0.802 0.836 0.844 0.866 0.695 0.014
Leverage 0.212 0.218 0.186 0.174 0.738 0.426 −0.028
Loss 0.220 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.610 1.000 0.043
Past restatement 0.084 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.429 1.000 0.066
R&D 0.114 0.111 0.000 0.006 0.959 0.130 0.004
Return on assets 0.029 0.020 0.044 0.045 0.477 0.625 0.059
Return volatility 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.912 0.884 −0.009
Sales growth 0.123 0.147 0.087 0.085 0.465 0.426 −0.061
Size 7.170 7.116 7.122 7.164 0.638 0.984 0.039
Soft assets 0.544 0.564 0.570 0.584 0.314 0.226 −0.084
Tobin's Q 1.832 1.913 1.432 1.423 0.480 0.695 −0.059
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for analyses of strong vs. non-clawback
(1) Misstatement and restatement analysis (2) CEO turnover and CEO pay analysis
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Audit committee size 4.801 4.000 2.735 5.032 5.000 2.814
Board meetings 7.874 7.000 3.383 7.789 7.000 3.325
Cash return 0.146 0.139 0.116 0.160 0.147 0.095
CEO age 55.910 56.000 7.060
CEO chair 0.511 1.000 0.500 0.532 1.000 0.499
CEO tenure 7.825 5.849 7.050
Chg. in acc. receivables 0.008 0.005 0.036 0.008 0.005 0.033
Discretionary accruals 0.059 0.032 0.092 0.055 0.032 0.084
Independent directors 0.747 0.762 0.085 0.750 0.765 0.085
Insider ownership 0.091 0.042 0.141 0.081 0.039 0.132
Institutional ownership 0.825 0.856 0.193 0.846 0.866 0.175
Leverage 0.217 0.200 0.182 0.206 0.190 0.166
Loss 0.182 0.000 0.386 0.139 0.000 0.346
Past restatement 0.061 0.000 0.240 0.058 0.000 0.233
R&D 0.094 0.001 0.661 0.041 0.002 0.078
Return on assets 0.037 0.049 0.118 0.052 0.055 0.094
Return volatility 0.027 0.024 0.014 0.026 0.023 0.013
Sales growth 0.089 0.067 0.280 0.072 0.065 0.192
Size 7.461 7.395 1.273 7.623 7.540 1.220
Share return −0.112 −0.201 1.944
Soft assets 0.577 0.616 0.226 0.590 0.623 0.212
Tobin's Q 1.742 1.401 1.100 1.748 1.430 1.055
Underperformance 0.634 1.000 0.482
Number of observations 3,324 2,600
Panel E: Descriptive statistics for analyses of weak vs. non-clawback
(1) Misstatement and restatement analysis (2) CEO turnover and CEO pay analysis
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Audit committee size 4.588 4.000 2.584 4.795 5.000 2.658
Board meetings 8.063 7.000 3.535 7.844 7.000 3.310
Cash return 0.143 0.136 0.121 0.158 0.145 0.104
CEO age 56.059 56.000 7.637
CEO chair 0.515 1.000 0.500 0.530 1.000 0.499
CEO tenure 8.442 6.425 7.142
Chg. in acc. receivables 0.010 0.005 0.038 0.010 0.006 0.037
Discretionary accruals 0.063 0.033 0.094 0.059 0.031 0.092
Independent directors 0.734 0.750 0.097 0.744 0.750 0.092
Insider ownership 0.112 0.051 0.154 0.090 0.044 0.126
Institutional ownership 0.808 0.843 0.199 0.839 0.865 0.176
Leverage 0.215 0.189 0.202 0.201 0.185 0.178
Loss 0.191 0.000 0.393 0.142 0.000 0.350
Past restatement 0.073 0.000 0.261 0.072 0.000 0.258
R&D 0.094 0.000 0.619 0.062 0.000 0.393
Return on assets 0.035 0.047 0.117 0.048 0.054 0.101
Return volatility 0.028 0.025 0.013 0.026 0.024 0.012
Sales growth 0.109 0.075 0.307 0.096 0.074 0.251
(continued on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
Panel E: Descriptive statistics for analyses of weak vs. non-clawback
Size 7.342 7.261 1.413 7.541 7.483 1.385
Share return −0.060 −0.202 2.283
Soft assets 0.562 0.585 0.228 0.569 0.595 0.222
Tobin's Q 1.792 1.410 1.227 1.816 1.459 1.173
Underperformance 0.639 1.000 0.480
Number of observations 3,228 2,522
Panel A presents statistics on the diﬀerences in propensity-scores between matched pairs of strong (weak) and non-clawback adopters. Panel B
(Panel C) presents the test statistics of covariate distributions for strong (weak) clawback adopters and non-clawback adopters. We show the p-
values for a parametric t-test of the diﬀerence in means and a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of the diﬀerence between two
distributions. Following Sekhon (2006), we bootstrap the KS-test with 2,000 bootstrap samples. We also report normalized diﬀerences to assess the
economic signiﬁcance of reported diﬀerences. Normalized diﬀerences is the diﬀerence in means for strong and weak adopter groups divided by the
square root of the average of the group variances. A normalized diﬀerence of 0.25 or less indicates an acceptable balance (Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009). Column (1) of Panel D presents descriptive statistics of the matched sample of strong clawback adopters vs. non-adopters for the
analyses of misstatements and restatements. Of the 3,324 observations, 1,759 (1,565) belong to strong (non) clawback adopters, and 1,919 (1,405)
to before (after) clawback adoption. Column (2) of Panel D presents descriptive statistics for the analyses of CEO turnover and CEO pay. Of the 2,600
observations, 1,402 (1,198) belong to strong (non) clawback adopters, and 1,446 (1,154) to before (after) clawback adoption. Column (1) of Panel E
presents descriptive statistics of the matched sample weak clawback adopters vs. non-adopters for the analyses of misstatements and restatements.
Of the 3,228 observations, 1,688 (1,540) belong to weak (non) clawback adopters, and 1,835 (1,393) to before (after) clawback adoption. Column
(2) of Panel E presents descriptive statistics for the analyses of CEO turnover and CEO pay. Of the 2,522 observations, 1,325 (1,197) belong to weak
(non) clawback adopters, and 1,382 (1,140) to before (after) clawback adoption. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%, and all
variables are described in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table A3
No matching of strong and weak clawback adopters.
Misstatement Restatement Turnover
Strong clawback −0.085 0.075 0.118
(−0.42) (0.34) (0.72)
After 0.204 0.185 −0.056
(1.06) (0.66) (−0.29)
Strong clawback × After −0.861*** −1.072*** −0.474***
(−3.99) (−2.93) (−2.84)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 4,408 4,408 3,455
Pseudo R2 7.44% 7.05% 15.70%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 0.089 0.015 0.190*
(1.50) (0.40) (1.76)
After 0.105 0.054 0.167*
(1.34) (0.96) (1.89)
Strong clawback × After −0.131** −0.026 −0.215**
(−2.48) (−0.65) (−2.37)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 3,458 3,458 3,458
Adjusted R2 44.90% 32.60% 32.70%
This table presents results if strong clawback adopters are not propensity-matched to weak clawback adopters. Continuous variables are winsorized
at 1% and 99%, and all variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the year and ﬁrm levels. Z/T-values are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A4
Robustness tests on index construction.
Panel A: Trigger subindex is set to zero in case of misconduct
Misstatement Restatement Turnover
Strong clawback 0.112 0.096 0.137
(0.55) (0.59) (1.11)
After 0.333 0.377 −0.240
(1.64) (1.54) (−0.88)
Strong clawback × After −1.289*** −1.597** −0.410***
(−3.38) (−2.24) (−2.85)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,914 2,914 2,354
Pseudo R2 12.30% 11.60% 14.00%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 0.032 −0.036 0.125
(0.59) (−0.93) (1.42)
After −0.000 −0.035 −0.032
(−0.01) (−0.96) (−0.39)
Strong clawback × After −0.081** 0.035 −0.099**
(−1.98) (1.00) (−1.99)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,354 2,354 2,354
Adjusted R2 52.10% 36.00% 34.00%
Panel B: Multiply Trigger subindex with the sum of other indices
Misstatement Restatement Turnover
Strong clawback −0.059 −0.043 0.298**
(−0.27) (−0.24) (2.13)
After 0.420** 0.408 −0.030
(2.29) (1.50) (−0.17)
Strong clawback × After −0.980*** −1.047*** −0.405**
(−4.03) (−2.76) (−1.96)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 3,018 3,018 2,477
Pseudo R2 10.20% 9.94% 16.50%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 0.075 0.016 0.228
(0.80) (0.24) (1.62)
After 0.116 0.039 0.151
(0.93) (0.48) (1.05)
Strong clawback × After −0.165* −0.045 −0.261*
(−1.75) (−0.67) (−1.91)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,477 2,477 2,477
Adjusted R2 41.40% 31.70% 34.50%
Panel C: No non-ﬁnancial triggers
Misstatement Restatement Turnover
Strong clawback −0.028 0.119 0.133
(−0.14) (0.81) (0.52)
After 0.332 0.369 −0.206
(1.63) (1.12) (−0.71)
Strong clawback × After −1.131*** −1.152*** −0.474*
(−4.40) (−3.47) (−1.93)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,944 2,944 2,462
Pseudo R2 9.89% 9.35% 17.80%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 0.053 −0.030 0.148*
(0.86) (−0.73) (1.71)
After 0.102 0.052 0.102
(1.45) (0.89) (1.40)
Strong clawback × After −0.096* −0.027 −0.146**
(−1.69) (−0.57) (−2.52)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes yes yes
(continued on next page)
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Table A4 (continued)
Panel C: No non-ﬁnancial triggers
Observations 2,462 2,462 2,462
Adjusted R2 45.51% 32.49% 33.99%
Panel D: Employee coverage sub-index removed from clawback strength index
Misstatement Restatement Turnover
Strong clawback 0.209 0.022 0.334
(0.66) (0.07) (1.15)
After 0.329 0.491** −0.260
(1.54) (2.36) (−1.39)
Strong clawback × After −0.698*** −1.008*** −0.422***
(−3.01) (−5.26) (−3.77)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes yes
Observations 2,935 2,935 2,441
Pseudo R2 9.17% 9.91% 15.60%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 0.106 −0.027 0.282*
(1.20) (−0.46) (1.83)
After 0.111 0.015 0.156
(1.57) (0.28) (1.14)
Strong clawback × After −0.152*** −0.056 −0.281*
(−2.67) (−0.53) (−1.86)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 2,441 2,441 2,441
Adjusted R2 39.20% 31.60% 29.90%
Panel E: Higher cut-oﬀ point to classify adopters as having strong (weak) clawbacks
Misstatement Restatement Turnover
Strong clawback −0.219 0.043 0.313
(−0.87) (0.17) (1.48)
After −0.162 0.153 −0.374
(−0.61) (0.45) (−1.20)
Strong clawback × After −0.794** −1.044** −0.475***
(−2.58) (−2.44) (−3.24)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes yes yes
Observations 2,074 2,074 1,572
Pseudo R2 13.30% 9.67% 20.90%
CEO total pay CEO non-incentive pay CEO incentive pay
Strong clawback 0.184* 0.128* 0.375**
(1.69) (1.78) (2.47)
After 0.229 0.116 0.370**
(1.52) (1.13) (1.98)
Strong clawback × After −0.229* −0.090 −0.357**
(−1.76) (−0.96) (−2.00)
Controls, year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes yes yes
Observations 1,572 1,572 1,572
Adjusted R2 35.31% 26.61% 30.06%
This table presents robustness tests on the Clawback Strength Index construction. In Panel A we set the Trigger sub-index equal to zero if the provision
explicitly mentions that a potential clawback requires personal misconduct on part of the executive. In Panel B we multiply, rather than sum up, the
Trigger sub-index with the sum of all remaining four sub-indices. In Panel C we remove non-ﬁnancial triggers and related index components that have
no direct relation to reporting integrity from the Clawback Strength Index. In Panel D we exclude the Employee Coverage sub-index from the Clawback
Strength Index. In Panel E we set the cut-oﬀ point to classify adopters as having strong (weak) clawbacks at the 75th- (25th-) percentile of the yearly
Clawback Strength Index distribution. We propensity-match strong adopters to weak adopters based on the alternative classiﬁcations of strong and
weak adopters. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%, and all variables are described in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to
clustering at the year and ﬁrm levels. Z/T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix A. Variables deﬁnition
Variable Description Data Source
Firm-speciﬁc Variables
After 1 for periods following clawback adoption, and 0 otherwise Own computation
Altman Z-score Calculation based on Altman (1968) Compustat
Big 4 1 if the ﬁrm is audited by a BIG 4 audit company, and 0 otherwise Compustat
Book-to-market Book value of equity divided by market value of equity Compustat; CRSP
Capital intensity Gross PPE divided by total net sales Compustat





Change in accounts receivables divided by trailing two years average total assets Compustat
Clawback Strength
Index
Sum of ﬁve standardized and [0; 1]-transformed sub-indices: Compensation
Coverage+ Employee Coverage+ Enforcement+Time Period+Trigger. Each
sub-index is based on a linguistic analysis of a ﬁrm's clawback provision obtained




Current ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities Compustat
Debt issuance 1 if the ﬁrm issues public debt and 0 otherwise Compustat
Discretionary
accruals
Absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals according to the
modiﬁed Jones model
Compustat
Downward revision 1 if the last available forecast of current-year EPS is less than the ﬁrst forecast of
current-year EPS, and 0 otherwise
I/B/E/S
Earnings growth 1 if change in net income is positive, and 0 otherwise Compustat
Earnings surprise Diﬀerence between reported EPS and analysts’ consensus EPS estimate scaled by




1 if the ﬁrm reports extraordinary items, and 0 otherwise Compustat
Foreign sales Ratio of foreign sales to total sales Compustat
Fourth ﬁscal
quarter
1 if the quarter is the fourth ﬁscal quarter, and 0 otherwise Compustat
Industry Indicator variables for Fama-French industries Compustat
Internationalization Foreign sales/Total sales Compustat
Inventory Natural logarithm of inventory Compustat
Leverage Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total book assets Compustat
Loss 1 if the ﬁrm reports a net loss in the period, and 0 otherwise Compustat
Misstatement 1 for ﬁrm-years that belong to a restatement period, and 0 otherwise Audit Analytics
Number of
estimates
Number of EPS estimates included in calculation of consensus estimate I/B/E/S
Past meet-beat 1 if the ﬁrm reported a positive earnings surprise in the previous quarter, and 0
otherwise
I/B/E/S
Past restatement 1 if a ﬁrm had an earnings restatement in the trailing two years, and 0 otherwise Audit Analytics
R&D Research and development expenditures divided by total sales Compustat
Restatement 1 for the ﬁrst ﬁscal year that is aﬀected by improper accounting that later
necessitated a restatement, and zero otherwise
Audit Analytics
Return on assets Income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets Compustat
Return volatility Yearly standard deviation of a ﬁrm's daily return CRSP
Sales growth One-year growth in total sales Compustat
SEO 1 if the ﬁrm issues common stock, and 0 otherwise Compustat
Size Natural logarithm of total assets Compustat
Share return Lagged yearly stock return CRSP
Soft assets Soft assets divided by total book assets, with soft assets deﬁned as total assets – total
property, plant, and equipment (net) – cash and short-term investments
Compustat
Strong clawback 1 if the Clawback Strength Index of a ﬁrm's clawback provision is above the yearly
sample median, and 0 otherwise
Own computation
Tobin's Q Book value of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities plus the market
capitalization of the ﬁrm divided by total book assets
Compustat; CRSP
Turnover 1 if there is a CEO turnover, and 0 otherwise ExecuComp
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Underperformance 1 if a ﬁrm's share return is smaller than the yearly industry share return, and 0
otherwise
CRSP




Two-year moving average of the total number of audit committee members Corporate library
Board meetings Number of board meetings held by a ﬁrm's board of directors Corporate library
CEO age 1 for CEOs aged 64, 65, or 66, and 0 otherwise following Weisbach (1988) Corporate library
CEO chair 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise Corporate library
CEO tenure Natural logarithm of a CEO's tenure (in years) ExecuComp
Independent
directors
Fraction of independent directors on a ﬁrm's board of directors Corporate library
Insider ownership Fraction of outstanding shares held by a ﬁrm's top management team Corporate library
Institutional
ownership
Percentage of shares held by institutional investors Thomson reuters
CEO Pay Variables
CEO incentive pay Natural logarithm of total minus non-incentive pay ExecuComp
CEO non-incentive
pay
Natural logarithm of the sum of salary and other pay ExecuComp
CEO total pay Natural logarithm of total pay ExecuComp
Appendix B. Index construction
We develop a Clawback Strength Index from a linguistic analysis of 4,464 clawback provisions by 1,534 ﬁrms. We identify ﬁve
dimensions of clawbacks. Each dimension represents a core element of a clawback and is reﬂected in a sub-index, all of which add up
to the Clawback Strength Index. In this appendix, we brieﬂy explain each sub-index. Please see Internet Appendix B for a more detailed
description of the index itself.
Compensation coverage sub-index
The Compensation Coverage sub-index captures which types of compensation are subject to a forfeiture. A clawback provision is
stronger if it explicitly lists more compensation types. We add one point for each type of compensation covered, and one point if the
provision covers compensation up to the full amount.
Employee coverage sub-index
The Employee Coverage sub-index focuses on the various groups of employees and/or individuals covered under the clawback. The
broader the employee coverage, the higher the score in the sub-index. We add two points to the Employee Coverage sub-index if the policy
mentions that it covers “employees” in general. We add only one point if it mentions “NEOs,” “executives,” or both. We add another point
if the provision explicitly mentions that all executives/employees are covered and if the provision covers former executives/employees. If
the provision explicitly lists certain executives (e.g., the CEO or CFO), we add 0.20 points for each listed function. We do not count
coverage twice (e.g., mentioning the CEO and NEOs will increase the index by one point, not by 1.20 points).
Enforcement sub-index
Clawbacks contain a considerable amount of discretion over enforcement. This discretion is captured by the Enforcement sub-
index. Firms receive a higher Enforcement sub-index score for the less discretion they grant in activating a clawback. If the provision
explicitly states that the board is obligated to recoup excess pay, we add one point to the Enforcement sub-index. If the ﬁrm has only
the right or option to enforce a clawback, we add 0.75 points to the sub-index. If the policy explicitly mentions the board's discretion
to enforce a recoupment, we subtract 0.25 points from the sub-index. Finally, we add 0.25 points if the policy mentions additional
actions, such as the termination of employment.
Time period sub-index
The Time Period sub-index distinguishes clawback provisions in terms of their look-back period, which speciﬁes how far a ﬁrm can
go back in time to recoup the compensation it had paid to its employees during that period. The score for the Time Period sub-index
increases with the length of the look-back period. As we have identiﬁed ﬁve look-back periods, we add one point if the look-back is
shorter than or equal to six months, two points if the period is between six and 12 months, three points if the period is between 12 and
24 months, four points if the period is between 24 months and 36 months, and ﬁve points if the period is longer than 36 months.
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Trigger sub-index
The Trigger sub-index captures the events that trigger a clawback. We group triggering events into ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
triggers. We add one point if a provision contains at least one ﬁnancial trigger, and one point if it contains at least one non-ﬁnancial
trigger.
We also check whether the triggering events are linked to hurdles to recovery and identify three hurdles: materiality, misbehavior,
and deliberateness. These hurdles reduce the likelihood of a potential recoupment. For example, a ﬁrm will ﬁnd it easier to activate a
clawback if it does not need to prove executive misconduct (misbehavior hurdle involved). We consider only whether a hurdle is
mentioned or not. For each hurdle, we subtract 0.25 points from the Trigger sub-index, resulting in a maximum discount of 0.75 points.
Firms that introduce objectively identiﬁable triggering events and no hurdles to recovery receive a higher sub-index score.
Summary
The following table shows how we assign the points to each sub-index. The column "Number of observations" details how many
provisions contain the respective component; the column "% of total" indicates the number of observations for each component by the
total number of clawback provisions (4,464).






Incentive compensation 1 2,982 66.8 0 1
Indirect proﬁts (e.g., stock sale gains) 1 826 18.5 0 1
Deferred compensation 1 409 9.2 0 1
Other compensation 1 275 6.2 0 1
Stock (option) compensation 1 181 4.1 0 1
Cash compensation 1 166 3.7 0 1
Up to the full amount 1 1,213 27.2 0 1
(2) Employee coverage
Explicitly: Executives 1 2,618 58.6 0 1
Explicitly: Employees 2 1,439 32.2 0 2
Explicitly: NEO 1 1,034 23.2 0 1
Explicitly: all employees or executives 1 920 20.6 0 1
Explicitly: former employees or executives 1 362 8.1 0 1
Explicitly: CEO 0.2 108 2.4 0 0.2
Explicitly: CFO 0.2 78 1.8 0 0.2
Explicitly: other functions (CAO, COO etc.) 0.2 35 0.8 0 0.2
(3) Enforcement
Words indicating that the board is obligated to claw
back
1 2,240 50.2 0 1
Words indicating that the board has discretion to
claw back
−0.25 2,162 48.4 −0.25 0
Words indicating that the board has the right to claw
back
0.75 782 17.5 0 0.75
Words indicating additional actions 0.25 624 14.0 0 0.25
(4) Time period
Shorter/equal 6 months 1 46 1.0 0 1
Shorter/equal 12 months and larger than 6 months 2 352 7.9 0 2
Shorter/equal 24 months and larger than 12 months 3 170 3.8 0 3
Shorter/equal 36 months and larger than 24 months 4 538 12.1 0 4
Longer than 36 months 5 134 3.0 0 5
(5) Trigger
Financial triggers Financial restatement 1 3,606 80.8 0 1
Financial misstatement 239 5.4
Poor performance 8 0.2
Write-oﬀ 7 0.2
Non-ﬁnancial triggers Breach of post-empl.
agreements
1 655 14.7 0 1
Negligence of duty 344 7.7
Criminal behavior 314 7.0
Termination for cause 280 6.3
Early departure 17 0.4
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Hurdles to recovery Materiality −0.25 2,732 61.2 −0.25 0
Misbehavior −0.25 2,478 55.5 −0.25 0
Deliberateness −0.25 1,488 33.3 −0.25 0
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